

CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

OCTOBER, 1969

The Soviet Union, 1969

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST	<i>Kurt L. London</i>	193
SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE THIRD WORLD	<i>Elizabeth K. Valkenier</i>	201
EAST EUROPE: THE POLITICS OF RECOVERY	<i>Stephen S. Anderson</i>	207
THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN THE 1970'S	<i>Nicolas Spulber</i>	214
THE SOVIET MILITARY SINCE KHRUSHCHEV	<i>Thomas W. Wolfe</i>	220
THE KREMLIN SCENE: POLITICS IN A CUL-DE-SAC	<i>George Ginsburgs</i>	228

REGULAR FEATURES

BOOK REVIEWS •	<i>Studies on the U.S.S.R. . Alvin Z. Rubinstein</i>	232
CURRENT DOCUMENTS •		
	<i>Statement of the World Communist Meeting</i>	234
	<i>Soviet Statement on Border Clashes .</i>	241
	<i>Chinese Statement on Border Clashes</i>	243
MAPS •	<i>East European Communist Countries</i>	213
	<i>The Borders of the Soviet Union</i>	221
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		245

FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CURRENT *History*

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY
The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY
Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:
D. G. Redmond

OCTOBER, 1969
VOLUME 57 NUMBER 338

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editors:
MARY M. ANDERBERG
JOAN B. ANTELL
ELIZABETH URROWS

Editorial Assistant:
JEAN HANSEN

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California
MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE
Yale University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City University of New York, Emeritus

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Portland State College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

Coming Next Month

Black America: A Historical Survey

The November, 1969, issue of *Current History* will survey three and one-half centuries of Negro experience in the United States. Seven authors will discuss:

The American Negro before the Civil War

by PRINCE E. WILSON, *Atlanta University*;

The Civil War and Reconstruction

by RONALD WALTERS, *Brandeis University*;

The Negro Experience: 1880 to 1956

by EDGAR A. TOPPIN, *Virginia State College*;

Civil Rights Progress to 1962

by NORMAN AMAKER, *NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.*;

Recent Black Experience in America

by ROBERT ZANGRANDO, *American Historical Association*;

The Negro in Politics

by RICHARD HATCHER, *Mayor of Gary, Indiana*;

Negro Education

by ROGER FISCHER, *Southwest Missouri State College*.

Published monthly by *Current History, Inc.*, Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila., Pa. 19103. Editorial Office: 12 Old Boston Road, Wilton, Conn. 06897. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1969, by *Current History, Inc.*

95 cents a copy • \$8.50 a year • Canada \$9.00 a year • Foreign \$9.25 a year
Please see inside back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1969

VOL. 57, NO. 338

In this issue, six authors discuss recent changes in the Soviet Union and its relations with the rest of the world. Our first author points out that in relations "with the United States, the Soviets have painted themselves into a corner. . . . Violent words and virulent propaganda notwithstanding, basic caution is likely to prevail."

The Soviet Union and the West

BY KURT L. LONDON

Director, Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, The George Washington University

TWO YEARS AGO, the Soviet Union celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution which led to the establishment of the Soviet state. Most of the books and articles published in the West to observe this event—well before the invasion of Czechoslovakia—did not regard post-Khrushchevian policy changes as revisionism in reverse. Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been removed when a new orthodoxy was instituted and important innovations were eliminated, leading to what is now called neo-Stalinism. To be sure, no Stalinist reign of terror was established, but prior attempts at modernization were unceremoniously dumped and replaced with Stalinoid policies.

It was, of course, impossible to turn back the clock all the way. So we now observe the dialectic of a Soviet communism which wants to maintain the old-time religion and at the same time tries to adjust itself to changes that cannot be ignored. This is an impossible task, and the regime of First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, which has no surplus of genius, has found it impossible to cope with such contradictions. All it has been able to

do is to suppress Khrushchev's quasi-Renaissance with its forces of counter-reformation.

KHRUSHCHEV, THE COMMUNIST PROTESTANT

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was a tough and convinced Communist and proved it often enough. But he was no theoretician; his approach to the many problems of his party and his country was primarily pragmatic although he pretended to be a "creative" Marxist-Leninist. Unwilling to carry the burden of Joseph Stalin's heritage, he purposefully separated his own image from that of the dead dictator. The upheaval he set in motion at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) must have appeared unavoidable to him if his intended modernization were to meet with any success. Perhaps if he had not been so unsystematic and so disorganized, the trend toward innovation might have succeeded.

Like the sorcerer's apprentice, Khrushchev had a habit of setting in motion hastily devised policies with whose consequences he was overwhelmed. In a sense, he symbolized

the contradictory nature of Communist dialectics, and it is not surprising that such a man should have produced contradictory policies. Many of his domestic measures tended to be benevolent without regard for their chances of success or failure; in world politics he was compulsive and convulsive and, in the Cuban missile affair, he actually went to the brink of nuclear war. He seemed to have adopted a policy of hit and run. He was a reformer at home but a dangerous man on the international scene.

Toward the end of Joseph Stalin's regime, the C.P.S.U. had almost fallen into limbo. Khrushchev strove to restore it to a position of preeminence, but he did not succeed in modernizing a hide-bound organization sufficiently to cope with the requirements of contemporary society. His 1962 party reform decreed the divisions of its machinery into two parts: one to keep track of industry, the other of agriculture. This system never worked and was abolished by his successors, as was Khrushchev's attempt to prevent the party leadership from becoming over-aged and sterile: his new party statutes were scrapped. He became the champion of the long neglected consumer, partly to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people, but mainly because he felt that nuclear weaponry had rendered traditional armament semi-obsolete. Some capital earmarked for conventional arms production could be transferred to consumer goods manufacturing, much to the discomfiture of the armed forces and orthodox party leaders. Khrushchev soon felt strong enough to permit some relaxation of control over the arts and literature; he allowed the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, because this work was an indictment of the Stalin era. But he failed to heal the chronic illnesses of Soviet agriculture, and his dream of overtaking the United States economy never came true.

Khrushchev's theses for the Twentieth C.P.S.U. Congress began a new era of inter-Communist relations which had its preview in 1955 when he and Premier Nikolai Bulganin visited Belgrade to patch things up

with Yugoslav President Tito. Once Stalin had been debunked and the "different roads to socialism" had been cleared of obstacles, the chains shackling all Communist parties to Moscow were loosened or broken. It was only a matter of time before both ruling and nonruling parties would de-Stalinize. Thereafter, international Communist cohesion became voluntary; Khrushchev propagandized a vision of a broad "social commonwealth"—an organizational vessel still guided, of course, by a Soviet pilot. But there were exceptions. East Europe had to remain a sphere of Soviet dominance, and no state in that area could leave the Warsaw Pact.

The Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open in 1960 with a verbal attack against the C.P.S.U. by the Chinese party in its theoretical journal *Hungchi*. The dispute had been simmering since the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., with whose tenets the regime of China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung did not agree at all. The rift impelled Khrushchev toward greater permissiveness in East Europe. The combined results of the Twenty-first and Twenty-second C.P.S.U. congresses further deepened the schism between Moscow and Peking. At the same time, pluralism in the "socialist camp" became rampant. International communism, no longer a centrally directed "movement," became a conglomeration of national communisms among which the Soviet brand retained a measure of predominance.

Khrushchev's policy toward the West and the Third World bespoke his fear of nuclear confrontation. But under the umbrella of "peaceful coexistence" he pursued, concurrently, policies of exacerbation and alleviation. This type of dualism in foreign policy suited his character. Thus he created crises, such as those surrounding Berlin and the Cuban missiles, but was unwilling to pursue them to the point of no return. He was daring as well as cautious, but his erratic gyrations did not suit the stodgy character of many of his colleagues or, presumably, of the armed forces. He did not achieve a Soviet solution to the German and Berlin issues and was defeated in his attempt to establish an

advanced Soviet missile base in Cuba. As the Sino-Soviet quarrel worsened, he lost much of the charisma of Kremlin leadership. Most of the time he seemed to improvise; but in the Soviet hierarchy there is little room for improvisation.

THE BREZHNEV COUNTER-REFORMATION

Almost immediately after his sudden departure, the team of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin methodically reversed most of Khrushchev's policies and introduced new (or, more accurately, old) policies. Domestic measures and foreign demarches indicated a return to orthodoxy. The Kremlin's new stance was symbolized by the restoration to honor of Stalin on the anniversary of V-E Day, 1965. Khrushchev's party reorganization was annulled. The effort to rationalize the economy to create a balance between supply and demand was virtually stopped, and heavy industry was once again assigned a major role in the 1966-1970 five year plan at the expense of the Soviet consumer. Greater diversification of armaments led to a reinvigorated arms race. The diffident beginnings of artistic liberalization were cut short as "deviating" writers were sent to labor camps, which increased in numbers. The Presidium was once again called the Politburo and the First Secretary of the Party became General Secretary, just as under Stalin. The Twenty-third C.P.S.U. Congress in 1966 rubberstamped these policies.

Peaceful coexistence, which under Khrushchev had become a basic strategy, was given continuing lip service but was downgraded in practice. The struggle against "imperialism" received increasing emphasis. Khrushchev's concept of the "state of all the people," implying that changed conditions no longer required a proletarian dictatorship, faded quietly into the background. The slogan "national democracy" took a back seat to doctrinaire revolutionary Marxism. An ideological campaign reached its climax with the decree of January, 1967, in which the permanent conflict between the camps of socialism and imperialism was reiterated. National liberation movements received new

attention from the leadership in the Kremlin.

To fortify relations between the U.S.S.R. and the East European satellites (this term, which some consider an anachronism, is used advisedly) Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Presidium President Nikolai Podgorny set out to re-establish closer supervision. There was a feverish concentration on personal diplomacy, similar to the *tour de force* of Communist persuasion-cum-threat which followed the Hungarian tragedy. At that time Khrushchev's envoys achieved a relative stability, sufficient to prevent a failure of the 1957 Moscow Communist summit conference. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev undoubtedly believed that East Europe must remain under the control of the U.S.S.R. But their methods were different, and the present leadership is making sure that East European countries do not abuse the concept of polycentrism in the pursuit of "different roads to socialism."

BREZHNEV'S FOREIGN POLICY

In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko emphasized the "special" importance of Europe for the U.S.S.R. This is manifestly true. Apart from the East European "socialist commonwealth," the Soviets are primarily concerned with West Germany, Western military and economic alliances and, above all, West Europe's close relations with the United States. At the center of Soviet attention has been the fear that the Federal Republic of Germany would acquire nuclear weapons, that the economic consequences of the Common Market and European prosperity would be detrimental to the Soviet economy, and that the strong United States influence in West European affairs would lead to a weakening of Moscow's strategic position. These apprehensions were eased to some degree by former French President Charles de Gaulle's policies; they may well be sharpened if de Gaulle's successor restores France to an active role in NATO and if the Common Market accepts Britain as a member.

Not long before his dismissal, Khrushchev seemed inclined to take a more tolerant view of West Germany. Indeed, the possibility of

a visit to Bonn was explored by his son-in-law. But the idea was dropped immediately by Brezhnev. The fact that a European security pact remained high on the Kremlin's agenda, with West Germany a central factor in such an agreement, did not prevent an escalation of Soviet hostility toward the Federal Republic of Germany. Brezhnev was undoubtedly under pressure from East German leader Walter Ulbricht, one of Moscow's most productive (and provocative) vassals. Furthermore, the new West German *Ostpolitik* which—like the “bridge building” policies of United States President Lyndon Johnson—clearly implied attempts at economic and cultural infiltration into the East European countries, was intolerable to the Soviet leaders. West Germany was surely an important consideration in the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia.

Probably West Germany did not fully realize the futility of her new policies, and President Johnson's advisers, eager for a *détente*, may have disregarded the fact that “peaceful engagement” with the East would be regarded as contrary to Soviet Communist and national interests. Thus, negotiations for establishing West German diplomatic missions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria were opposed by Moscow, Poland and East Germany. Meanwhile, Berlin remained a particularly sore spot in East-West relations. The Soviet leaders, aware of the United States commitment, had no intention of provoking a nuclear war. Hence there remained a stalemate, and a Soviet-United States confrontation in Europe became remote. At the same time, United States-U.S.S.R. relations remained stagnant. The document issued by the June, 1969, meeting in Moscow of 75 parties does not augur well for these relations.¹ Whatever improvements have been attempted since 1965 either were of no lasting consequence (the Glassboro, New Jersey, meeting) or emerged as *ad hoc* discussions concerning specialized agreements which did not modify basic Soviet policies.

Mikhail Suslov, a Soviet political leader,

¹ For excerpts from this document, see pp. 234 ff. of this issue.

once explained that peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. Dedication to coexistence is reasserted in the June, 1969, document but it is made clear that this dedication must be no bar to national liberation movements. Nor is peaceful coexistence applicable to relations between the oppressor and the oppressed or between colonizers and the victims of colonialism. The document defines the United States as the leading “imperialist” state “growing more aggressive.” And the war in Vietnam, like the Korean war before it, provided a tailor-made propaganda framework for an assault on the evils of imperialism.

Concurrently, the Soviets have pressed their bid to negotiate a strategic arms control treaty. Soviet leadership evidently believes it can bargain from a position of strength, considering the pressure of anti-war sentiments in the United States. An arms control treaty would enable the Soviet government to channel more capital into the economy, which needs bolstering; and the Kremlin would reap propaganda capital from a demonstration of peaceful intentions. There is no evidence that the current Soviet leadership is working for a genuine *détente* or for a basic overall improvement of relations with Washington.

Indeed, it is disturbing that a few minor agreements and the offer to negotiate a strategic weapons treaty have been seen by many Western observers to indicate that the U.S.S.R. is no longer motivated by aggressive Marxism-Leninism. The Western belief in the erosion of Communist ideology helped to create this impression. Only the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, jolted government and academic Sovietologists into a more balanced and more realistic position. Perhaps as shocking as the invasion itself was its justification by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine which decreed limited sovereignty for the East European subject states. It established re-satellization, underscored the precariousness of the Rumanian position, and constituted a veiled threat to Yugoslavia, which is neither contiguous to Soviet territory nor subject to Soviet orders.

(Soviet control of Yugoslavia would endanger Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, and Western supply routes to Greece and Turkey.)

In the Middle East, the political vacuum left by the British and the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict has offered the Soviets a splendid opportunity to extend their influence and presence in an area which was coveted even by the Tsars. It is now generally believed that the Kremlin was guilty of precipitating the June, 1967, war by feeding false information to the Egyptians and their allies. Thus, the Arab defeat was also a defeat for Moscow, which felt constrained to reequip the Egyptian armed forces immediately. In a 1966 Cairo meeting between U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kosygin and the Soviet fleet commander, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Soviet naval facilities are believed to have been discussed. From then on, Soviet naval power constantly increased in the Mediterranean, a development which may have begun after the abortive Suez campaign of 1956. In addition to the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, Soviet vessels also appeared in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. Soviet publications have made it clear that the Red Fleet is to become a global strategic force.

While the Kremlin is interested in keeping the Middle East kettle boiling, the outbreak of a new Arab-Israeli war as a result of Arab guerrilla provocations is not considered acceptable. In June, 1969, *Pravda* warned the Arab governments to pursue their goals by political rather than military means. There is no indication that the irrationality of the Arabs will be replaced with realism, and this may be the reason why Moscow joined the Western powers in a search for a peace-making formula. But although Brezhnev's orthodoxy and aggressiveness cannot conceal a basic caution, and although a new Arab-Israeli war would not be in the Soviet interest, a satisfactory formula is unlikely to be found. The Soviet desire to retain influence in the Arab world probably will preclude the development of a four-power proposal that would be acceptable to Israel.

Apprehension lest Red China become a threat to Soviet security and to the future of world communism has played an increasing role in Moscow's decision making ever since the early 1960's. It may have impelled the Kremlin to show some conciliatory gestures to the United States. But although the recent border clashes have added fuel to the fire, the belligerent statements of the two opponents, especially China, are not necessarily indicative of impending large-scale hostilities. The Chinese Communist leaders, irrational as they appear to be in domestic endeavors, are intelligent enough to recognize that such a war would endanger their system. Mao's warning to the Chinese people to be prepared for war is on the same level of credibility as was Stalin's slogan of "capitalist encirclement." In the U.S.S.R. war finds few advocates but there seems to be a growing uneasiness among the Soviet people lest a modern Genghis Khan ride again.

THE DILEMMA OF DUALISM

It must be difficult for the men in the Kremlin to formulate their dualistic policies—part national, part Communist—and to strive for "coexistence" without seeking genuine peace. Such a peace would dampen revolutionary strategy and end the international class struggle to which the present Soviet leaders are committed.

In appraising the Soviet position in the world, it is essential to keep in mind that the U.S.S.R. is both a nation state and a Communist-ruled society. During the past half century, these two elements have gradually blended into an amalgam. The question is whether Marxism-Leninism still plays a predominant role or whether national self-interest outweighs ideology in Soviet decision making. The majority opinion in the West seems to be that ideology has eroded to the point where it is mainly a façade, providing the men in power with a motivational tool with which to maintain their position. The arguments of many Western social scientists (especially of the behavioral and psychological schools) expose their own "ideological" suppositions about the Russian nature rather

than any close acquaintance with the nature of the Soviet leadership.

Admittedly, there are signs of ideological fatigue in the U.S.S.R., especially among the intellectuals. But it would be a mistake to overestimate the impact of this fatigue on the ruling circles. They control all the instruments of power; incipient rebellions can easily be put down. Generations of Soviet citizens have been reared under a system which was identified with the motherland. Thus the prevalent political climate has become as much a part of their thinking as the Judeo-Christian tradition is inherent in the personality of Western man. The political religion, on which the government was based, has left an imprint on the people's minds and habits, even if they have not memorized chapter and verse of their gospel. They live within the confines of their beliefs. They are no longer fanatics for after half a century it cannot be expected that revolutionary fanaticism will endure. But revolutionary policies will survive as long as the Soviet system exists. And diversification (polycentrism) does not necessarily write "finis" to the history of Soviet communism. The Russian writer, Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin, compares the ideology of the Soviet regime to the axle of a carriage: without it the carriage cannot move. One could add that even the most ruthless power wielders have to have something to live by. They are, however, well aware that the official ideology is losing its power to inspire. All the more, their rule is dependent on their control of the vast coercive apparatus.

The greatest danger to this system is neither outside aggression nor internal ideological laxity. Rather it is the failure of the leaders to adapt their system to modern developments. For all his belief in Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev must have sensed this problem and tried to cope with it. His lack of success can be ascribed not only to his erratic behavior but also to the dilemma of a man who realized that modernization would require the overturn of basic political tenets. This he could not bring himself to try.

The Brezhnev regime, sensing the dangers

of modernization to the Soviet state, turned to counter-reformation: it re-Stalinized. In this respect, there may have been some disagreements and personal frictions in the Politburo. But the alleged power struggle in the Kremlin most likely is based more on disagreements over tactics than on basic rivalry between so-called "conservative" and "liberal" elements. The evidence of such a conservative-liberal conflict is elusive. On what grounds can we describe Brezhnev as the guardian of orthodoxy and Kosygin as guardian of the liberal? Have we any reason to believe that Kosygin is more "liberal" simply because his main interest seems to point to international economics and relations as opposed to Brezhnev's hard party line? Is it not possible that Kosygin, an economic technologist, has assumed that role without being a "liberal"? Cannot the General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. be expected to speak a language different from that of his colleagues who represent the U.S.S.R. outside its borders?

The Soviet approach to policy is dialectic. It is presumptuous to deduce from the behavior of a man like Kosygin that he is less a Marxist-Leninist than Brezhnev. Moreover, there are no "liberals" in the Politburo. Nor are there "liberals" in the party, only outside of it, mainly among the writers and scientists. Our information has never been sufficient to produce a sound estimate of disagreements within the Kremlin. Former United States Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson, who had ample opportunity to study the leaders for many years, has correctly warned against too much speculation on this issue.

Many Western observers doubt that Brezhnev's position is secure and they predict his early downfall. This is possible, of course, for there is no job security in the Kremlin. But if he and his partisans were replaced by somewhat younger leaders, men like A. N. Shelepin, P. E. Shelest or P. N. Demichev, they would be even less inclined to modernize. Both age groups must face the fact that, as developments in technology lead to a greater sophistication of living, the revolution of ris-

ing expectations will be harder to suppress. This may turn out to be one of the thorniest problems confronting the men who rule Russia in the 1970's.

It is astonishing that these men remain so dogma-ridden. They do not seem to recognize how present political trends throughout the world could help them; they seem unable to readjust their doctrine, to adapt their goals to today's realities and, above all, to abandon their anachronistic tactics of subversion. There is today a world-wide tendency towards the left. This "new" left finds itself at a crossroads: one way leads to democratic socialism, the other to communism. Considering the legions of splinter groups, this is, of course, an oversimplification, but we probably can say that the majority of the left is not "new." Rather, it is old-fashioned and not particularly internationalist; it has had enough of revolutionary upheavals, has achieved most of its goals and resents dictatorial regimes just as it detests anarchy. Moscow has not understood that democratic socialism has the best chance to achieve what "the masses" want, namely, peace, egalitarianism, economic security and freedom of communication inside and outside their countries. Yet the Soviets persist in considering democratic socialists as mortal enemies.

Lately there has been some evidence that this vestige of Leninism may be modified. But can neo-Stalinism accomplish this without jeopardizing Leninism itself? One step further: dare the Kremlin introduce policies that will win the confidence of social democrats and other moderate elements left of center? Can it regenerate its own system without eventually destroying it? For, if pluralistic elements were introduced into Soviet society, that society would lose the totalitarian character which guarantees the perpetuation of its ideology. The men who rule on the basis of this doctrine will not voluntarily relinquish their vested interests. This is why their economy suffers; its improvement is impossible without political liberalization.

The Soviet rulers have at their disposal a tremendous military establishment and a per-

vasive police apparatus in which the K.G.B., the secret police, plays a predominant role. They have perpetuated a judiciary which interprets law not on a legal but on a political basis. Controlling these powerful organizations, they rule absolutely. Thus the West is misled in regarding the rebellious elements among intellectuals as a sign of the regime's weakening. The intellectuals are a nuisance to the Soviet leaders but can easily be controlled. The Russian people and all other nationalities living within the Soviet territory have never had a chance to experience democracy as we know it and they bow to governmental tyranny much as their forebears suffered the rule of the Tsars. Thus it would be foolish to expect a "counter-revolution" in the foreseeable future, unless the Kremlin were to become so fractionalized as to lose control of the army and the security organs. In that case, the armed forces would probably fill the political vacuum. But the vast majority of the Soviet people, including many intellectuals, do not seem to have any real desire to change the system.

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE 1970's

It is always risky to predict. One can only offer educated deductions. Political developments depend on legions of circumstances that can radically affect regional and global conditions. Yet in the case of the Soviet Union the crystal ball shows a discernible picture of the near future. The U.S.S.R. is today one of the most conservative powers in the world, defending its status quo with renewed vigor. Yet the philosophy on which this status is based has become obsolete.

There has been much speculation about a possible shakeup of the Politburo in the 1970's, possibly at the time of the Twenty-fourth C.P.S.U. Congress in the spring of 1970, which may coincide with Lenin's hundredth birthday anniversary. A shakeup will not guarantee progress toward liberalization. In fact, the opposite may be the case.

The Kremlin's greatest handicap is its lack of maneuverability. So long as it remains unwilling to adapt to changing times and to acknowledge the rising expectations of the

Soviet people and of subject nations, the risk persists that it will make serious miscalculations. We must assume that the vested interests in ideology of the higher party echelons will remain overwhelming during the coming decade. The political religion will continue to help maintain these groups in power, and the fusion of ideology with "Soviet patriotism" (nationalism) will continue. This fusion has served the Soviets well. Western statesmen often find it difficult to determine where communism ends and nationalism begins.

I see no prospect of major shifts in the direction of Soviet foreign policy during the 1970's—provided the United States remains at least on a par with Soviet power. The Soviet leaders will persist in exerting a controlling influence over their "socialist commonwealth" in East Europe. As to relations with the United States, the Soviets have painted themselves into a corner from which they will have difficulties extricating themselves. The old "imperialist" bogeyman is unlikely to be discarded but—violent words and virulent propaganda notwithstanding—basic caution is likely to prevail. The Soviets have no taste for nuclear war.

The background for the Russians' sudden readiness to enter into negotiations for strategic arms control is too involved to be recounted here; a special study involving not only Soviet but also United States domestic politics would be useful. Suffice it to point out that the offer was one of several measures (the non-proliferation treaty, the consular convention, the Moscow-New York air service and a cultural agreement) which had the desired effect in Washington. The euphoric idea of a Soviet-United States détente took hold of the Johnson administration and was dampened only by the Czechoslovak invasion. But détente, for Moscow, is a method and not a goal. Given the trend toward orthodoxy, a détente would necessarily have tactical reasons. Three main motives for a Soviet type of relaxation of tensions may be discerned: to take advantage of the desire for détente on the part of the American people and the administration; to threaten, by impli-

cation, Red China with Soviet-United States collusion; and to achieve some *ad hoc* agreements in the interest of the U.S.S.R. without giving up nuclear first-strike capabilities.

Détente is necessary and acceptable as long as it is understood. Even if negotiations toward limitations of nuclear arms lead to a treaty, it must be kept in mind that to the Soviets, détente serves temporary purposes. Like peaceful coexistence, it has two aspects: one promotes tactical accommodation, the other proclaims a continuation of the ideological struggle (cold war) without necessarily leading to hot war. This concept is based on Lenin's thesis that the class struggle in one country must be carried into the international arena.

It is doubtful that Soviet policy toward the Middle East will undergo a metamorphosis during the coming decade. Economic and military infiltration will continue. Although the Kremlin is concerned over the continuing Arab-Israeli clashes and wants the state of semi-war to be contained, it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders are interested in a genuine accommodation. In the unlikely event of an Arab-Israeli understanding, Soviet influence probably would be weakened.

Since the China problem dominates Soviet political thinking at least as much as Moscow-Washington relations, Asia inevitably plays a special role. It may be speculated that Kremlin leaders do not regard the United States presence in Japan, East and Southeast Asia as altogether bad so long as it blocks Chinese Communist advances. For all the Soviet shouting about the war in Viet-

(Continued on page 238)

Kurt L. London is a professor of international affairs at The George Washington University. He formerly served in the United States Office of War Information and in the Department of State. He recently edited *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), and is the author of *Permanent Crisis* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell, 1967) and *Soviet Union: A Half-Century of Communism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).

"Soviet newspapers and academic journals are highly critical of the radical but economically unsound policies pursued by many aid recipients. . . . Peking, on the contrary, encourages economic radicalism."

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in the Third World

BY ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER

Research Assistant, European Institute, Columbia University

IN THE CURRENT phase of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, China militantly encourages revolutions, while the Soviet Union follows a moderate, pragmatic course that has more in common with traditional diplomacy and power politics than with revolutionary strategy.

In the past five years, little has happened to change Peking's outlook or its methods of exerting influence. If anything, the Cultural Revolution has heightened revolutionary fervor and strengthened China's disinclination to adapt her dogma to changing conditions elsewhere. China still lacks the economic and military power to project and protect her interests on distant shores. Thus she continues to manipulate her single effective weapon—the intransigent call to the non-white, poor nations to rise in revolt against the rich industrial West.

One year after Premier Nikita Khrushchev's ouster, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin announced that the U.S.S.R. would concentrate on its domestic economic development as the best means of furthering world revolution,¹ thereby removing national liberation movements from Moscow's immediate concerns.

In the Soviet view, the anti-colonial struggle, which the Chinese regard as the

motive force of world revolution, has customarily been secondary to the vanguard role of the Western proletariat. During Khrushchev's ascendancy, however, national liberation revolution was exploited as a convenient issue with which to belabor the West. There was close ideological identification with and material encouragement of all anti-colonial movements and radical nationalist leaders. These Khrushchevian policies, like many of his "hare-brained schemes," were repudiated by his successors, who preferred to gain influence through regular channels.

This turn in Soviet policy has had to proceed against two obstacles: the unwillingness or the inability of Soviet leaders to forego revolutionary rhetoric, and the unabated Chinese challenge to traditional Soviet revolutionary leadership. Both circumstances help explain many uncertainties in the current Soviet posture.

MODERATION IN THEORY

Recent developments in the Third World have spurred Soviet disengagement from radicalism. The ready response of Africans and Asians to China's racial, underdog propaganda and the precipitate collapse of several radical regimes (beginning with Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella's government in June, 1965) undermined two optimistic Soviet assumptions. It became difficult to claim that there was a firm and natural alliance between the former colonial countries and the U.S.S.R., or that a sprin-

¹ The lead article in *Pravda* on October 27, 1965, stated: "In building socialism and communism the socialist countries make the most important contribution to the world revolutionary movement."

klings of Soviet-aided projects in the public sector, plus a few publicized visits between the Soviet leaders and the local ruling parties, would put these states irreversibly on the road to socialism. Finally, the defeat of Egypt in the six-day war of 1967 demonstrated the hazards of close Soviet identification with a militant nationalism.

Facile optimism has given way to realistic appraisal by Soviet functionaries and scholars. Sloganeering and arid theorizing have been replaced by hard-headed factual analysis. Today, neither the political leadership nor the party newspaper *Pravda* claim that "the fraternal alliance with the peoples who have cast off the colonial yoke [is] a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy," as was stated in the 1961 party program. Instead, there are complaints that the new states do not give the U.S.S.R. proper support at the United Nations and other international forums.

Soviet scholars are doing more objective work. Increasingly, the research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences are presenting an unvarnished picture of prevailing conditions in the Third World, in contrast to earlier efforts to fit developments into a pattern of inevitable evolution toward socialism. This new objectivity is encouraged by the authorities. Specialists are urged to provide detailed factual analyses—precise answers and recommendations that can be implemented—instead of theoretical formulations that have not proved "too useful" in the past.²

As for explicit ideology, Khrushchev's revisionism has been clearly abandoned in re-

cent years. Khrushchev's innovations had obliterated the difference between the democratic, nationalist and socialist phases of the revolution in order to telescope the Third World's progress toward socialism into one continuous process that could be led by radical nationalists in single-party states, with Communists playing a subordinate role.

Russian ideologues and scholars no longer credit non-Communist nationalist forces with the ability to perform historic tasks that Marx said only the proletariat and its party could achieve.³ This does not, however, signify a return to a hard leftist strategy. The Soviets are again distinguishing two phases of the liberation revolution, each with a distinctive set of goals to be achieved under the leadership of different social forces. The developing countries are currently said to be in the democratic phase, in which national democrats must complete specific historic tasks before moving into the second phase, when socialist goals can be attempted under the leadership of Communists.

Meanwhile, the Chinese have retained their adherence to an older orthodoxy. At the height of Khrushchev's revisionism, in 1963–1964, the role of Communists in the national liberation movement was an important issue in Sino-Soviet polemics. Chinese theory, while not opposed to alliances with nationalists and democrats, has consistently rejected a subordinate role for Communists and has adamantly insisted on the leadership of the party even during the phase of a broad national front. Today, as the Cultural Revolution runs its course, the Chinese Institute of International Relations is still preoccupied with imminent revolutionary upheavals in the Third World.

By contrast, the pro-Moscow Communists in the developing countries—though encouraged to act independently and not to subordinate themselves to the nationalists—are by no means exhorted to seek hegemony or to seize power. Current Soviet writings and pronouncements on the Third World are full of warnings against "skipping stages" and against premature radical steps. Having reacknowledged the Marxist link between the

² See the important party directive, "On Measures for the Further Development of Social Sciences," *Pravda*, August 22, 1967; also the editorial in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, December, 1967, pp. 5–10.

³ R. A. Ulianovskii, the Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee division dealing with the Third World, neatly illustrated this shift. In an article in the January, 1966, issue of *Kommunist* he still maintained that the liberation revolution could enter the socialist stage without benefit of the dictatorship of the proletariat and without a Marxist-Leninist party. Two years later, in the January 3, 1968, issue of *Pravda*, he was much less enthusiastic about the reforms instituted by revolutionary democrats and spoke of a necessary further stage in which only Marxist-Leninists were competent to lead.

level of productive forces and the advent of socialism, the Russians now argue that the economic and social bases for a new social order must be created first. To attain this objective, Moscow believes that Communists should pursue policies that are, on the whole, constructive.

A DIPLOMACY OF MODERATION

Although a Soviet rapprochement with pro-Western countries like Iran and Senegal began as early as 1963, the trend of Khrushchev's policies was to use the Third World to wage cold war, polarizing countries on issues that offered the most revolutionary opportunities. Typical were his solitary support of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, his endorsement of Indonesian President Sukarno's territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia, and his appeal to U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser to unify the Arabs on a class basis against the remnants of feudalism and imperialism. But with Khrushchev's downfall, his policies of opportunistic ideological favoritism were jettisoned. His successors seek to win friends and to influence countries through customary diplomatic means. Peking, by contrast, persists in the search for influence by fishing in troubled waters.

In Asia, the U.S.S.R. has extricated itself from one-sided relationships with India and Indonesia. Since the first state visit of a Pakistani head of state to Moscow in April, 1965, the Soviet Union has been careful to treat India and Pakistan with impartiality, abandoning its former support of India's position on Kashmir. When fighting broke out on the subcontinent in the fall of 1965, China spurred Pakistan to carry on her "just struggle" and harassed India with ultimatums, while Russia avoided taking sides and appealed for a peaceful settlement. Soviet efforts to use power responsibly to promote stability brought a negotiated truce between the combatants at Tashkent in January, 1966.

The Soviets accepted Sukarno's downfall in Indonesia and the end of his "confronta-

tion policy" with obvious if unobtrusive relief. They proceeded to cultivate ties with Malaysia, which had been vigorously denounced as a neocolonial creation to preserve Britain's presence in Southeast Asia. Trade agreements were initialed in September, 1966, and diplomatic relations were established in November, 1967. Similar overtures to Singapore met with success in 1968, and the Philippines are next on the list.

There are, to be sure, limits to the Soviet drive to win favor. The U.S.S.R. has not tried to normalize relations with vociferously anti-Communist Thailand, but neither does it support the insurgency in the north which has full Chinese endorsement. Peking publicizes and supports guerrilla activity in Burma and Malaysia, and there are indications of Chinese involvement in the recent separatist disorders in East Pakistan.

Because of the direct Chinese threat in Asia, the Soviet Union has concluded that expanded bilateral relations and active propaganda against Peking are no longer sufficient to shore up its own position. At the June, 1969, meeting of 75 Communist parties, Brezhnev spoke of the need to create a system of collective security in Asia.*

THE MIDDLE EAST

Moderation gained the upper hand in Soviet policy toward the Middle East only after the June, 1967, war. Chastened by the turn of events for which its unilateral backing of radical regimes was partly responsible, the U.S.S.R. now poses as the friend and protector of all Arab states. Accordingly, it has sought to improve relations with Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco to win support for a political solution to the conflict. Moscow's efforts to improve relations with moderate states in the immediate area and with Iran and Turkey are clearly undertaken to disengage the Soviet Union from too exclusive a reliance on U.A.R. President Nasser.

Chinese opposition to the Soviet search for a peaceful settlement is not limited to shrill charges of Russian collusion with the Western powers. China propagandizes actively for the various Palestinian refugee organizations

* For excerpts from the statement issued by the meeting, see p. 234 of this issue.

and provides them with military support. Among her latest gambits has been the offer of offensive weapons to Syria, following Syria's failure to obtain them from the U.S.S.R.

Moscow's changed attitude toward Palestinian extremism is undoubtedly due to the fear that China might gain too much influence with that segment of Arab opinion. Right after the June, 1967, war the Soviets were outspoken in condemnation of Arab extremism.⁴ But within the year, the U.S.-S.R. shifted to an unenthusiastic acceptance of the Arab guerrillas. In January, 1969, it endorsed the militant resolutions of the Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples, which recognized the legality of the Palestinian resistance. Radical Arabs, however, realize well that this is merely a verbal, tactical concession. During Kosygin's visit to Algeria in March, 1969, Algerian Prime Minister Houari Boumédiène pleaded with the U.S.S.R. to recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

THE AFRICAN ARENA

In Africa, also, Moscow strives to be on good terms with all the established regimes regardless of their political coloration. It woos not only the moderate states like Senegal, but also the least revolutionary states like Ivory Coast and the Congo (Kinshasa)—both formerly branded as outposts of capitalism. Whereas Moscow has maintained diplomatic relations with Kinshasa since December, 1967, and backs the federal government in Nigeria, Peking supports the remnants of Antoine Gizenga's rebels in the Congo and has taken up the cause of Biafra.

Soviet relations with the radical states of Guinea and Mali (once regularly cited as "progressive" models for the rest of the

Third World) have gone sour. Their radicalism became less attractive when both countries (under the aegis of socialism) instituted drastic "reforms" that ruined their economies and then demanded (in the name of revolutionary internationalism) that the U.S.S.R. bail them out with additional aid. No word of regret appeared in the Soviet press when Mali's President Modibo Keita was overthrown in November, 1968.

Instead of championing the radical states, the Soviets now back the continental Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). What is more, in order to undercut Chinese influence they seem to champion the African states' demands that aid to the liberation movements in the still existing colonies be channelled through the O.A.U. The Russians have opposed the dissolution of the O.A.U.'s Liberation Committee and have urged the African states to increase their contributions to its budget. At the same time they have pressed the O.A.U. to withdraw recognition from liberation groups backed by Peking and to switch to those favored by Moscow.⁵

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, also, the U.S.S.R. seeks an image of respectability through expanded diplomatic and trade relations. Influence is sought not through reliance on revolutionary action on the part of local Communist parties or on the part of Cuba, but rather by encouraging neutralism and economic nationalism. At first, because of the Chinese and the Cuban challenges from the left, the Russians did not know how to combine their new preference for regular channels with their traditional emphasis on revolution. At the Tricontinental Conference, held at Havana in January, 1966, they felt they could not formally dissociate themselves from the militant call to Latin Americans to sweep away their governments by violent revolution. But subsequently, according to Western press reports, Soviet diplomats hastened to assure various Latin American regimes that the U.S.S.R. did not really support the conference declarations.

⁴ "Tuchi sgushchayutsia," *Pravda*, July 29, 1967; "The Khartoum Conference," and "The Situation in the Arab World," *New Times* (Moscow), August 16, 1967.

⁵ This was the case with the shift of financial support from the pro-Chinese Pan-African Congress, known for its black militancy, to the African National Congress, which favors a multiracial solution for South Africa. Radio Moscow, September 4, 1968.

By now the Soviets are so intent on increasing contacts with the established regimes that the Colombian government's vigorous campaign against the pro-Moscow guerrillas has not deterred the Soviet Union from gaining diplomatic recognition from Colombia through attractive trade offers. Moreover, the Russians deemed it unnecessary to offer any explanation to the political opposition in Colombia.

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's theories, which are more popular among Latin American rebels than those of Mao, are disparaged by the U.S.S.R. Instead, Moscow publicizes the views of those Latin American Communists who argue that while there is a "general revolutionary situation" on the continent there is no "specific revolutionary situation" anywhere. It also publicizes the activities of the parties that seek alliances with reformist nationalist movements or parties that participate in elections.

STRATEGIC POLICIES

Militarily, the Soviets are trying to secure more dependable means of influence. Moscow still offers arms assistance whenever the West refuses to do so, in order to acquire a quick foothold—Nigeria provides a recent example. But, increasingly, the Russians are using foreign airports and harbors to extend the reach of their power.

The Red Navy first appeared in the Mediterranean Sea in 1964. Since the 1967 Middle East crisis it has taken to cruising regularly around the Arabian Peninsula, around Africa and the Indian Ocean. Squadrons of Soviet bombers have started paying "friendly visits" to the U.A.R. and Syria.

This newly manifested ability to project military power was preceded by years of a patient build-up of strategic facilities under the guise of economic assistance. In 1958, the Soviets undertook to construct a Red Sea port for Yemen at Hodeida and to modernize

the Conakry airport for Guinea. Since then, they have been extending Aeroflot lines, building or reconstructing ports and developing commercial fishing facilities for countries stretching from Singapore to Senegal.

In the past two years, a definite pattern of Soviet moves into potential trouble spots has emerged. Early in 1968, Moscow persuaded Jordan to accept economic aid for a number of unspecified "maritime projects," thereby extending the Soviet presence into the Gulf of Aqaba. No longer satisfied with its leverage in Iraq and the use of the port of Basra, Moscow has sought to increase its influence in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait is now enlarging its fishing fleet with Soviet-built seiners on which Kuwaiti sailors receive training from Soviet experts. Soviet mobility in the Indian Ocean has been substantially strengthened within the last ten months with the offer of aid to modernize the port of Aden (a port of call for Soviet warships cruising from Vladivostok), the extension of Aeroflot service to Singapore, and the opening of a regular Black Sea-Singapore shipping line.

It is not merely the Western military experts who see these steps as moves into the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the British presence east of Suez by 1971. Peking has denounced Soviet activities as an attempt to contain China⁶ and has charged that the Red Navy has become a tool for establishing the naval supremacy of a new colonial empire.⁷

Whatever the goal, the current Soviet drive to establish a presence along important air and maritime routes suggests a search for bases (not necessarily military bases but rather refuelling, repair and landing facilities) that could give the U.S.S.R. far more tangible advantages in the event of conflict than the mere equipping and training of local armed forces.

AID POLICIES

Recent Soviet aid policies are no longer as haphazard or as politically motivated as they were. They are becoming more clearly defined and economically more justifiable. Instead of trying to revolutionize the economic

⁶ "Butchers of the People's Revolution in Southeast Asia," *Peking Review*, May 16, 1969, pp. 24-27.

⁷ "Peking Accuses Moscow of Build-up in Indian Ocean," *The New York Times*, May 18, 1969.

institutions of the recipients and to create propaganda effects by financing large industrial projects in the state sector, the Soviets are sponsoring more programs that serve the development needs of the new states and mesh with the needs of the Soviet economy.

Despite many constructive aspects of Khrushchev's aid policies, they were distinguished by his penchant for the propagandistic and the spectacular. Typically, he granted another \$250 million credit to Indonesia in 1960 even though none of the projects under the terms of the 1956 credit of \$100 million had been completed, and many had not even been started. In part, this generosity was stimulated by Indonesian policies that corresponded to the development theories the Soviets held in those days: growth would result from the economic liberation attained from the West when foreign enterprises were nationalized and import-substitution industries were established.

A tightening up of aid and a reevaluation of policies were evident by 1963, but there were no new departures until after Khrushchev's fall. Since 1965, the Soviets have been pressuring their clients among the new states to give up unrealistic economic expansion in favor of consolidation, better planning and efficient management.

In the case of the U.A.R., where the availability of easy Soviet credit had encouraged Nasser to embark on an ambitious industrialization program, the Soviets reversed themselves in 1966. They supported the scrapping of the seven-year development plan in favor of a three-year stabilization program designed to complete projects already started and to promote those that promised early returns.⁸ In India, Kosygin was so appalled during his January, 1968, visit by the poor management and underutilization of the giant plants set up with Soviet aid that he had the 1966 aid agreement revised. Some funds, originally earmarked for new projects in the fourth

five year plan, were diverted to raise the efficiency of industrial enterprises built in India's state sector with Soviet assistance.⁹

Soviet newspapers and academic journals are highly critical of the radical but economically unsound policies pursued by many aid recipients. Objections to "ultra-revolutionary haste" in resolving complex economic problems figure prominently in the discussion. The term covers almost any reform which necessitates management and control by the state in excess of its capacity to administer the reform efficiently. For example, Mali has been accused of "ultra-revolutionary haste" in setting up hundreds of agricultural producers' co-ops with only a handful of trained agronomists in the country; Burma has been similarly criticized for nationalizing retail trade when the state was obviously unable to operate any distribution network. Soviet objections to economically unjustifiable radicalism also extend to criticism of premature rupture of traditional economic ties with a former metropole and the expulsion of foreign capital.

Peking, on the contrary, encourages economic radicalism. It was on Chinese advice that Zanzibar decided to nationalize retail trade and eliminate private business. The failure of these measures was afterwards attributed by Zanzibar's Vice-President A. K. Hanga to a "lack of proper economic justification and sufficient study of profitability."¹⁰

Another mark of Soviet interest in stabilizing and developing the economies of the new states is the increasing number of projects that serve the domestic needs of the U.S.S.R. For this purpose, assistance to several countries is beginning to be based on coordinated planning. Permanent bilateral economic commissions have been or are shortly to be set up with India, Iran, the U.A.R., Algeria,

(Continued on page 240)

⁸ *Ob'edinennaya Arabskaya Respublika* (Moscow, 1968), p. 157.

⁹ "Moscow and Delhi," *New Times*, February 5, 1969, p. 11.

¹⁰ Quoted in *Mizan* (London), September-October, 1967, p. 199.

Elizabeth K. Valkenier, a specialist in Soviet policy toward developing countries, is the author of "Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the National Liberation Movement" in *International Communism After Khrushchev* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), and many journal articles.

After the Czech crisis of 1968, which was a "self-created setback" for the Soviet Union, the Communist superpower "improved relations with East Europe, employing a judicious mixture of military force, economic inducement and intensive diplomacy—all part of a familiar pattern."

East Europe: The Politics of Recovery

BY STEPHEN S. ANDERSON

Associate Professor of Government, Windham College

THREE YEARS AGO this writer concluded a *Current History* article on Soviet-East European relations with the statement that "a reversion to the charismatic/terroristic policy of Stalin or the military interventionism of 1956 is out of the question. . . . The essence of Soviet relations with East Europe is now negotiation—a process of multilateral and bilateral dealings with leaderships which, although certainly not equal to the Soviets in power and prestige, are sufficiently autonomous to preclude any form of direct Soviet dictation."¹

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Five* shatters the complacency of that statement. Military intervention is clearly still an acceptable technique under certain conditions, even if charismatic terrorism probably is not. The invasion was a rude shock to many observers of Soviet policy towards East Europe. Yet the Soviet leaders must also have experienced a shock as they became aware of the detrimental results of the invasion in East Europe and elsewhere.

¹ Stephen S. Anderson, "Soviet Relations with East Europe," *Current History*, October, 1966, p. 205.

* This term will be used throughout this article to designate the five powers which cooperated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20–21, 1968: the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. The term derives from a meeting in Warsaw which drafted the ultimatum producing the crisis, and should be distinguished from the term "Warsaw Pact" which includes the five states mentioned plus Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet leadership intended a swift surgical operation to remove the troublesome reformist regime of Czechoslovakia's Alexander Dubcek and replace it with a group subservient to Moscow. Instead, it suddenly found itself faced with a nation of Czechs and Slovaks united as never before in their history behind a national Communist leadership virtually single-minded in its determination to resist the Soviet demands by all means short of open insurrection. The 500,000 troops of the Warsaw Five could occupy the country and seize its leaders, but they could not conceal from themselves, or from the world, the intensity with which their presence was resented. The Soviets had doubtless not expected wreaths and smiles, but the fervor of the Czechoslovak reaction appeared to throw them temporarily off balance.

Nor was this the extent of their troubles. Rumania was further alienated from the bloc and a virtual Rumanian-Yugoslav entente was formed; the bloc's two multilateral bodies—the Warsaw Treaty Organization (W.T.O.) and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (C.M.E.A.)—were weakened; there was disorientation within the world Communist movement; the NATO alliance was rejuvenated; and, finally, political unrest in the Soviet Union itself was intensified.

It should be noted also that these developments occurred at a time of rapidly-deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China. As it moved ominously

from the polemical and economic stages into open military confrontation along an extended and difficult frontier, this conflict began to place the Soviet leadership in an extremely uncomfortable position. Clearly, the Soviets needed support wherever it could be garnered—from their own people, from East Europe, from the Communist movement, even from the West. The furor over Czechoslovakia severely hampered their quest for support against China.

Such consequences seem a heavy price to pay for the satisfaction of disciplining a small if recalcitrant Communist party in a lesser East European nation. Powerful factors must have impelled the Soviets towards intervention. Actually, the decision to invade was apparently made after a formal accord had been reached between Czechoslovakia and her bloc critics. There is evidence of conflict and uncertainty within the top Soviet leadership both before and after the invasion. However, the underlying reasons are clear enough.² On the one hand, there was a real concern that the reforms and liberalizations being undertaken in Czechoslovakia would have unsettling effects on her more conservative bloc partners, in particular on neighboring Poland and East Germany, and perhaps even on the U.S.S.R., whose unruly Ukrainian Republic adjoins eastern Czechoslovakia. The reforms included the complete lifting of censorship, virtually unlimited freedom of public discussion, a thorough overhaul of the economic system tending toward much greater reliance on the market, and a toleration of semi-organized political groups which seemed to be paving the way for the revival of a multiparty system.

On the other hand, there was also concern that Czechoslovak actions might weaken Soviet bloc defenses. Soviet troops had never been stationed on Czechoslovak soil (except briefly after World War II) even though Czechoslovakia borders on the Federal German Republic on the west, and although the country had long been considered one of the

weak links in the Warsaw Pact system. Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the pact and her pursuit of a neutral foreign policy—Hungary had attempted this during her 1956 revolution—would radically alter the whole strategic situation in Central Europe in favor of NATO. There were repeated assurances by the Dubcek government that Czechoslovakia contemplated neither withdrawal from the pact nor export of her reforms. But the Soviet leadership was taking no chances.

The growing conservatism of the Soviet leadership—particularly of younger men pushing up from below—also influenced Soviet policy toward East Europe in this period. "Conservatism" and "liberalism" are slippery terms. What is meant here by conservatism is a narrow, unimaginative approach to politics which fears rapid change or deep reform, which is more comfortable with leaders who control movement than those who stimulate it, and which rejects a dynamic pluralism in favor of fixed norms of behavior. Liberalism may be seen simply as the obverse of these traits. Liberal leadership has been virtually nonexistent in Soviet history, but different periods and different leaderships have displayed less conservatism than others.

The years since Nikita Khrushchev's ouster have seen a slow but steady trend toward greater conservatism in the Soviet leadership. This is particularly marked in domestic policy, but can also be seen in foreign—and bloc—policy. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the continuing occupation of that unhappy country provide the clearest and most dramatic manifestation of this neo-conservatism in Soviet-East European relations. A more liberal (and self-confident) Soviet leadership might have accepted the risks and the challenges of working with the Dubcek regime, not only because the regime was legitimate and popular, but because in the long run this would have offered a better, more durable basis for bloc cohesion. The Moscow conservatives took what undoubtedly seemed to them to be the surer road of forcible repression.

Soviet policy towards East Europe since the Czechoslovak crisis can be regarded as a

² See Alvin Z. Rubinstein's very useful discussion, "Czechoslovakia in Transition," *Current History*, April, 1969, pp. 206 ff.

process of recovery from the difficulties created by that event. Several questions may be raised about the impact of the crisis and its aftermath upon Soviet neo-conservatism. Did the crisis intensify Soviet conservatism? Did it moderate it? Did it have no effect? Domestic developments lie beyond the scope of this article. The extent of conservatism in Soviet post-invasion relations with East Europe, however, is a legitimate subject for analysis here.

Generally speaking, Soviet policy toward East Europe since August, 1968, has been a policy of circumspection. There have been no major crises precipitated by the Soviets; there have been no public efforts to silence opposition, with the obvious exception of Czechoslovakia. Even with regard to Czechoslovakia, considerable care was exercised to avoid further trouble.

The Soviet Union had to justify the invasion itself to allies and critics. The initial, transparently false assertion that troops had been dispatched at the invitation of the Czechoslovak government was quietly dropped in favor of a rather startling position which quickly became known—among its critics at least—as the doctrine of limited sovereignty. First enunciated in *Pravda* in late September, 1968, and subsequently repeated by Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet officials, the doctrine asserts that absolute sovereignty is not compatible with membership in the Socialist Commonwealth;** for duty to the world Communist movement supersedes duty to nation. National sovereignty may be legitimately set aside if events within a particular socialist state are endangering the movement, in which case intervention by fraternal socialist states may be undertaken. The definition of “endangering” lies in the hands of the intervening state or states.

Not surprisingly, this doctrine gained somewhat less than universal acceptance among

Communists around the world. The Chinese and their allies branded it a clear statement of great power chauvinism, having nothing to do with communism or a Socialist commonwealth. A number of the powerful West European Communist parties expressed dismay over its implication that independence and sovereignty are conditional for Communist states. In East Europe, both Yugoslavia and Rumania attacked the doctrine, categorically denying that any socialist state or group of states had any right to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. The Soviet Union's four partners in the Czech invasion supported the doctrine, although with varying degrees of fervor (Hungary being the least enthusiastic). Interestingly enough, the Czechoslovak leadership, even when reconstituted last spring, did not give the doctrine official endorsement. Indeed, very little has been heard of it in 1969—it was quietly ignored at a major world Communist conclave in June, 1969—and it may well be that the Soviets themselves would prefer to forget it for the time being.

More important than Soviet doctrines, however, are Soviet actions in East Europe. Let us consider Czechoslovakia first. Not daring to establish a puppet regime in Czechoslovakia in the face of intense popular and party resistance, the Soviets instead began a prolonged process of negotiation supported by force and designed to coerce both the government and the populace gradually to accept Soviet demands. The existing leadership was retained virtually unchanged but it was compelled bit by bit to roll back the reforms and liberalizations of the preceding eight months. Censorship was reimposed; foreign travel was limited; the composition of political, academic and cultural cadres was altered to conform to Soviet wishes. An important step in this process was the signing of a treaty, in mid-October, 1968, accepting the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Thereafter, East German, Bulgarian, Polish and Hungarian troops and the bulk of the Soviet troops were withdrawn, reducing the occupying force from 500,000 to a less conspicuous 70,000.

There was opposition to all these steps in

** A rather loose term, now used chiefly by the Soviets and their supporters to describe the system of nations ruled by Communist parties and working to build socialism. For a fuller discussion of the doctrine of limited sovereignty, see Kurt L. London, “The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth,” *Current History*, April, 1969, pp. 193 ff.

Czechoslovakia, but no Soviet action was sufficiently dramatic or onerous to generate a violent mass uprising. Meanwhile, Soviet pressure continued through the winter and spring of 1969. Finally, in April, using the pretext of widespread anti-Soviet demonstrations following a Czechoslovak hockey victory over the Soviet Union, and underlining their demands with an additional 20,000 occupation troops, the Soviets were able to bring about the resignation of party chief Alexander Dubcek. He was replaced by Gustav Husak, a man more amenable to Soviet guidance and far less liberal than Dubcek, but still enough of a middle-of-the-roader to avoid mass disturbances. By the summer of 1969, the Soviet Union appeared to have Czechoslovakia under control. There was deep animosity toward the Soviet Union, but Czech leadership was in the hands of men trusted by the Soviets.

RUMANIA

Rumania posed a different problem. Far less important strategically than Czechoslovakia, she was under the tight control of a Communist leadership more interested in self-assertion in foreign policy than in liberalization in domestic affairs. At the time of the Czech invasion, Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu made no effort to conceal his opposition to the Soviet Union and even consulted with the Yugoslavs on joint defense measures. This was surely galling to the Soviets, coming after long-standing Rumanian obstructionism over Soviet bloc military and economic integration. It is possible that during the fall of 1968 the Soviet leadership considered military action against Rumania. Soviet troops were dispatched to Bulgaria and Warsaw Pact troops conducted exercises along Rumania's borders. At a Warsaw Pact conference in December, the Soviets reportedly demanded Rumania's permission for spring maneuvers on her territory, which the Rumanians are said to have refused.

In February, 1969, Soviet pressure was again brought to bear, this time for Rumanian participation in joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers in East Germany. Rumania again declined.

A subsequent visit to Bucharest by Warsaw Pact Commander (and Soviet Marshal) Ivan Yakubovsky and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov appears to have been another Soviet effort to browbeat the Rumanians. Thereafter, during the spring of 1969, the Soviets endured in silence a series of Rumanian gestures of defiance. The Rumanians held additional consultations with Yugoslav President Tito and attended the Yugoslav party congress in March, 1969 (boycotted by all the other Soviet bloc parties). They opposed the inclusion of the Soviet-Chinese clash on the Ussuri River on the agenda of the Warsaw Treaty Organization meeting in March. In June, 1969, Rumania made a statement from the floor at the Moscow meeting of 75 Communist parties, criticizing the Soviet handling of the Chinese issue. Finally, in August, Rumania granted President Richard Nixon's request to visit Bucharest, making Rumania the first Communist country to be visited by an American President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt met Stalin at Yalta in 1945. Forebearance and caution seemed to be the keynotes of recent Soviet policy toward Rumania.

Soviet policy in this period towards the remaining East European nations exhibits no remarkable or innovative features. In May, 1969, Bulgaria was apparently rewarded for her steadfast support of the U.S.S.R. at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis and during the days of tension with Rumania in the fall of 1969 by a lavish trade agreement providing extensive Soviet development aid. Hungary, too, signed a major trade agreement in March, 1969, calling for a 250 per cent increase in Soviet-Hungarian trade over the next five years, and detailing the construction of a new pipeline to carry Soviet oil to Hungarian industry.

Soviet-East German relations came briefly into prominence during March, 1969, in connection with East German efforts to prevent the West German Parliament from holding its presidential election in Berlin. The Soviets at first supported these efforts, but backed off as the showdown approached, apparently unwilling to lessen chances for an

East-West détente merely to satisfy East German concern over the status of West Berlin. Soviet-Polish relations remained close and cordial, hardly surprising in view of the strong support which Poland provided at the time of the Czech invasion under the leadership of Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka, an erstwhile liberal grown conservative in recent years. By contrast, Soviet relations with Albania were virtually nil; Albania broke the last remaining tie to the Soviet bloc—membership in the Warsaw Pact—shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in protest against that action.

The situation with regard to Yugoslavia, another outspoken opponent of the invasion but a country potentially much more useful to the bloc, was different. Although the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships kept up a steady stream of criticism of one another during the fall and winter of 1968, the door was left open for negotiation, and in February, 1969, a trade agreement was signed calling for a 16 per cent increase in trade during 1969, to \$2.7 billion annually. The Soviet Union is already Yugoslavia's most important bloc trading partner. Soviet leaders boycotted the Yugoslav party congress in March, 1969, and the Yugoslavs reciprocated by declining to attend the June, 1969, conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow. However, no criticisms of Yugoslavia were made at that conference, and by midsummer the two leaderships appeared to be exploring the possibility of rapprochement.

Let us turn now to Soviet actions within the two multilateral bodies which help create—or at least are designed to create—cohesion among Soviet bloc members. As mutual assistance organizations, both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid are particularly vulnerable to the effects of conflict among their members. Effective cooperation within an organization suffers when five of its members have invaded and occupied a sixth, while the seventh stands aside condemning their action. The Czech invasion was probably more damaging to the W.T.O. than to C.M.E.A., because it was carried out more or less under

the former's aegis, while the latter was not directly involved. W.T.O. meetings during the past year have tended to be brief and unproductive; virtually no progress has been made toward the supranational command structure that was achieved some time ago in NATO (albeit without France) and which the Soviets have long urged. The March 17, 1969, meeting of W.T.O.'s Political Consultative Committee lasted only two and one-half hours and produced no significant changes in the organization's structure or policies. The committee did issue a declaration on European security, discussed later in this article. Reportedly, at this meeting the Soviets also sought pledges of military assistance in their conflict with China, or at least tried to place the issue on the agenda (fighting had broken out on the Ussuri River a fortnight earlier). In this attempt, they were blocked by the Rumanians.

C.M.E.A. seems to have been similarly marking time during 1968–1969. It held only one major meeting, a three-day high-level conclave in April, 1969, which produced platitudes and truisms for the most part: recognition of the need for better plan coordination among members, of the need for a review of C.M.E.A. functions, and so forth. The only important decision to emerge from this conference was a plan to establish a C.M.E.A. Investment Bank to promote the flow of investment funds among C.M.E.A. members. Apparently, the Soviet delegates played a deliberately retiring and low-key role in the deliberations, their main concern being to convince the other members—in particular Rumania—that continuing cooperation and integration would not be detrimental to national sovereignty.

Thus Soviet activity in both organizations appeared quite modest in 1968–1969. Either organization could emerge as a major instrument of Soviet policy, when circumstances become more propitious or the need grows more desperate.

NATO REJUVENATED

The rejuvenation of NATO was mentioned earlier as another negative consequence of

the Czech invasion. The alliance, which had been approaching its twentieth anniversary in a state of considerable disarray (due mainly to the East-West détente), received a new lease on life. The ability of the Warsaw Five to place upwards of 500,000 troops in Czechoslovakia in the space of a few days and the illumination of the "weak link" in the NATO forward defenses raised disturbing questions about NATO's adequacy. For several years France had been a harsh critic of the alliance. Yet at the November, 1968, meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers, France reconfirmed her attachment—politically, if not militarily—to NATO. The conference issued a strong communiqué condemning the Czech invasion and occupation, detailing measures to be taken to strengthen NATO militarily and insisting that "By its constitution, the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary."³

Short of a withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, which was of course out of the question, there was little the Soviets could do to reverse the process of NATO's rejuvenation, other than to act circumspectly and to assert their continued interest in East-West détente. Their interest in such a détente was reiterated on a number of occasions, most notably at the March, 1969, W.T.O. meeting discussed above, which issued a lengthy call for a Pan-European Conference (excluding the United States) to discuss problems of European security and peaceful cooperation. This merely updated a similar call made three years earlier, the main difference being that this statement was considerably more moderate in its discussion of United States "imperialism" and West German "revanchism." Soviet restraint of East Germany in the March, 1969, Berlin "minicrisis" over the West German presidential election should also be seen as an effort to calm Western nerves.

Time is probably on the sides of the Soviets in this matter of NATO's vitality. As

the shock of the Czech invasion wears off and the situation in Czechoslovakia "normalizes," the underlying pressures for détente will begin to reassert themselves. Indeed, by the summer of 1969, the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to be on the verge of serious arms limitation discussions. The NATO powers had paid little attention to the March call for general European security meetings, but this need not preclude future consideration.

Soviet relations with the world Communist movement are also relevant to this discussion. "Consternation" best describes the Communist world's response to the invasion. This was 1956 all over again, with the difference that in 1968 the movement was already deeply disoriented by the burgeoning Sino-Soviet conflict. Communists around the world found themselves forced either to oppose the Soviet Union or to condone the suppression of a legitimate Communist leadership. As already noted, there was extensive criticism among non-ruling Communist parties, both of the invasion and of the Soviet Union's subsequent efforts to justify it.

However, more damaging to Soviet interests than these verbal assaults was the related reluctance of many of these same Communist parties to attend the long-heralded Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, at which the Soviets were hoping to reestablish their leading role in the world Communist movement and to create a solid anti-Chinese bloc. In preparation for several years and scheduled originally for November, 1968, the conference was postponed *sine die* in late September when it became clear that an embarrassingly large number of important parties were unwilling to attend.

During the winter and early spring of 1969, the Soviets succeeded in convening several meetings of the conference's preparatory

(Continued on page 241)

Stephen S. Anderson has taught at Boston University and Marlboro College. He has traveled widely through the Balkans. Professor Anderson is a frequent contributor to *Current History*.

³ *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (London), December 7-14, 1968, p. 23070. For excerpts, see *Current History*, April, 1969, pp. 239ff.

East European Communist Countries



—Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*.
© 1967 by the Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

Yugoslavia has never been a member of the Warsaw Pact. Albania formally severed her last link with the pact after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

"Throughout the years ahead," writes this economist, "both planning streamlining and management stimulation through rewards tied to profits should improve economic performance and help accelerate the Soviet Union's pace in its avowed race with the United States." At the same time, "the pressure of the consumers for more welfare—in short, for a better life, rather than for more military power—should grow in intensity."

The Soviet Economy in the 1970's

BY NICOLAS SPULBER

Professor of Economics, Indiana University

IN THE EARLY 1970's, the total United States output of goods and services (Gross National Product or GNP) at current prices will top the fantastic level of over one trillion dollars a year, while the GNP of the Soviet Union, the second world power, will probably reach roughly one-half of this total, i.e., the United States level of the mid-1950's. According to Western estimates, at constant 1966 prices, the United States and Soviet GNP's will reach 1,016 billion dollars and 547 billion dollars respectively in 1974. In the Soviet Union's deliberate "race" with the United States, according to these estimates, the Soviet GNP as a percentage of the United States GNP rose (at 1966 prices) from 36.4 in 1955 to 46.4 in 1965, and should rise to 50.6 in 1970 and to 54.2 in 1975.¹ According to the Soviet statisticians, however, the Soviet net material product (i.e., national income excluding services) has already reached 63 per cent of the United States net national product in 1967.²

The Soviet Union grew very fast through the 1950's: it doubled its GNP during that

decade at constant prices—from \$132 billion in 1950 to \$272 billion in 1961. The rate of growth has, however, slowed in the 1960's. Current Western estimates project Soviet growth through the mid-1970's at the very respectable rate of growth of 5.4 per cent per year, slower than in the 1950's, but still high in relation to a United States rate of growth estimated to range from 4.0 to 4.5 per cent.

The GNP, irrespective of the population required to produce it, is an overall measure of an economy's capabilities and particularly of its military potential. GNP per head is a more suitable measure of an economy's efficiency and of a country's level of development. The Soviet GNP per capita in comparable prices has risen from \$951 in 1955 to \$1,439 in 1965 and should reach (according to Western projections) \$1,811 in 1970 and \$2,227 in 1975. This compares to a GNP per capita of \$3,062 for the United States in 1955, \$3,655 in 1965 and an estimated \$4,192 in 1970 and \$4,726 in 1975. As a percentage of the United States per capita income, the Soviet income would rise over a 20-year period from 31.0 per cent to an estimated 53.1 per cent.

This substantial increase would certainly be an impressive one: in 1975 the Soviet Union would match the 1966 per capita GNP of France and would closely approach

¹ John P. Hardt *et al*, *Recent Soviet Economic Performance, Selected Aspects* (Washington, D.C.: Research Analysis Corporation, Paper RAC-P-38, 1968), *passim*.

² *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, v 1967 g. National Economy of the USSR in 1967*, Moscow: Statistika, 1968, p. 139.

TABLE I: SOVIET PRODUCTION IN 1966 AND 1970 (PLANNED) AS A PERCENTAGE OF U.S. 1966 OUTPUT^a

	Soviet 1966 output as a percentage of U.S. 1966 output	Soviet 1970 (planned) as a percentage of U.S. 1966 output
Fuel and power		
electric power	41.0	62.5– 64.0
coal	120.7	134.9–137.0
oil	72.8	84.3– 86.7
gas	32.2	46.1– 49.2
Ferrous metals		
pig iron	84.0	112.4–116.0
crude steel	79.6	101.9–106.0
rolled steel	85.2	105.5–110.0
Chemicals		
mineral fertilizers	64.2	100.3
plastics	15.7	33.9– 37.1
chemical fibers	28.1	47.9– 51.0
rubber tires	15.0	20.7– 21.8
Machinery and equipment		
metal cutting machine tools	24.4	279.5–292.2
motor vehicles total	25.7	78.5– 87.2
tractors	128.2	201.1–209.5
Consumer goods		
Durables:		
cars	2.6	8.1– 9.3
refrigerators	47.0	113.1–119.5
washing machines	87.7	113.1–119.5
television sets	35.6	113.1–119.5
radios	23.0	29.6– 30.3
Soft goods:		
cotton fabrics	89.2	(data not available)
footwear	80.6	94.2– 97.3

^a Underlying data: physical outputs, official Soviet and U.S. data respectively.

Sources: Soviet Economic Performance 1966–67, Materials Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 90th U.S. Congress. Second Session, May 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 24–25; and “The Soviet Eighth Five Year Plan,” in *ASTE* (Association for the Study of Soviet-type Economies) *Bulletin*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, Summer, 1966.

the West German level of that same year. But it would still be substantially behind the United States level which it has hoped to “reach and surpass” by the beginning of the 1970’s.

Since the establishment of the thorough-going planning era at the end of the 1920’s, the Soviet policy makers have succeeded in transforming their economy from one suited primarily for the production of agricultural

raw materials into one suited for the production of investment goods on a large scale. According to the calculations of Professor Raymond Powell of Yale, throughout the period 1928–1966—i.e., from the beginning of comprehensive planning to the eve of the current five year plan—the Soviet GNP grew at the impressive rate of 5.4 per cent (at 1937 prices) as compared to an average 3.3 per cent for the United States. Taking into account that during this period the U.S.S.R.’s growth was set back by the war, this is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement.³

³ Raymond P. Powell, “Economic Growth in the USSR,” *Scientific American*, December, 1969, pp. 17ff.

The principal component of Soviet economic growth has been the growth of its industrial output. Between 1959 and 1965, during the so-called seven year plan, the GNP grew at 5.4 per cent per year—industry at 7.8 per cent and agriculture at 1.6 per cent. The 1966–1970 plan called for a yearly increase of 8.0–8.4 per cent in industrial output and 4.7 per cent in agriculture, but the actual rates in the first years of the plan were on the order of 7.4 and 3.7 per cent respectively. The rate of growth of total industrial output has tended to decline since the 1950's, but has remained at high levels. From 1951 to 1955, the Soviet industrial output grew at 10.7 per cent per year; between 1956 and 1960, at 9.5 per cent per year and between 1961 and 1965, at 7.6 per cent per year.

Given the heavy stress placed by the Soviet policy makers on the production of certain industrial raw materials and the machinery needed for further expansion of the Soviet capacity to produce investment goods, impressive rates of growth have been achieved in the production of fuel and power, iron and steel, machinery and equipment. On the other hand, the development of consumers' durables—particularly cars, refrigerators, washing machines and the like—and of consumers' soft goods has been slow.

As can be seen from Table 1, based on physical outputs in the key industries on which overall industrial output and further growth strongly depend—electricity, iron and steel, machinery—the U.S.S.R. has reached respectable levels in relation to the United States. In electricity, its 1966 output has been on the order of 41 per cent of the United States output; in iron and steel, on the order of 80–85 per cent of the United States output, and for metal cutting machine tools, as high as 244 per cent of the United States output. On the other hand, Soviet outputs were far below the United States production in the critical branches of plastics, chemical fibers and motor vehicles. Finally, as far as consumers' goods durables were concerned, Soviet outputs were very low and

for a much larger population—U.S.S.R., 231.8 million and United States, 196.9 million in 1966. (See Table I.)

Ratios of the 1970 Soviet outputs to the United States output of 1966 should increase significantly. However, even if it achieved its highest plan targets, the U.S.S.R. would still continue to produce only 64 per cent of the 1966 United States electrical output, from one-third to one-half of its chemicals, 87 per cent of its motor vehicles, and a very limited output of cars or radios for a further expanded population (a probable 243.2 million in the U.S.S.R. in 1970 as against 196.9 million in the United States in 1966). In this perspective, the official Soviet claim that it has already reached "over 90 per cent" of the United States industrial output in 1967 is clearly not acceptable.⁴

SOVIET INPUTS AND EFFICIENCY IN THEIR USE

Economic growth depends on increasing supplies of productive resources—capital, labor, natural resources—and on improvement in their technological utilization. According to the calculations of Professor Powell, the Soviet capital stock (equipment, all construction, inventories and livestock) rose between 1928 and 1966 at the extraordinary rate of 6.5 per cent per year. This increase was achieved thanks to an annual Soviet expenditure on investment which rose (at 1937 prices) from some 8 per cent of the GNP in 1928 to over 30 per cent in the late 1950's. According to official Soviet data, over the 50-year period from the beginning of the revolution through 1967, 39.0 per cent of the capital expenditures were allocated to industry (including the building industry)—of which 31.5 per cent were allocated to the key "producers' goods," fuel and power, iron and steel and machinery—15.3 per cent to agriculture, 10.3 per cent to transport, 15.7 per cent to institutional, commercial and other public buildings and 19.7 per cent to other construction, including individual construction.⁵

The civilian labor force rose in the U.S.S.R. from 79.8 million in 1950, to 93.9 million in

⁴ *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 618.

TABLE II: U.S.S.R. AND U.S. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IN 1966
(Total in millions of people and percentages)

	Millions		Percentages	
	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.
<u>Agricultural</u>	39.7	4.0	36.1	5.5
(including workers on private plots)	(11.9)			
<u>Nonagricultural</u>	70.2	68.9	63.9	94.5
Total	109.9	72.9 ^a	100.0	100.0
Nonagricultural	70.2	68.9	100.0	100.0
mining and industry	27.7	19.7	39.5	28.6
building	5.8	2.9	8.3	4.2
transportation & communication	8.5	4.2	12.1	6.1
trade	6.3	13.3	9.0	19.3
credit and insurance	0.3	3.1	0.5	4.5
government & administration	1.5	11.5	2.0	16.7
public health, education				
science and other	20.1	14.2	28.6	20.6

^a The total U.S. labor force, including the unemployed, was 75.8 million.

Sources: R. H. Reed, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 and 26, and *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1967* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1967), pp. 221 and 224.

1960, and 107.8 million in 1965. According to Western projections, the Soviet civilian labor force should reach 119.2 million in 1970 and 133.0 million in 1975.⁶ A comparison with the United States civilian labor force reveals both the far larger Soviet labor inputs for a smaller output, and the highly divergent employment patterns in the two countries. In 1966, for instance, the total Soviet labor force exceeded by far the United States agricultural and nonagricultural labor force. With an agricultural labor force ten times as large as that of the United States, the Soviet Union produced—according to its own estimates—85 per cent of the United States agricultural output; with an industrial labor force exceeding by 40 per cent that of the United States labor force in industry, the Soviet Union achieved—again according to its estimates—

roughly 66 per cent of the United States output.⁷

Western estimates indicate that Soviet growth was primarily due to the massive increase in inputs, rather than to increased efficiency in their use. Possibly more than half and perhaps as much as three-fourths of the Soviet growth may be attributed to the ever greater expansion in productive resources, rather than to vigorous expansion in the efficiency with which they were used. The official Soviet statistics indicate that in 1967 the productivity of Soviet labor in industry was on the order of 45–50 per cent of the American⁸; this ratio is far lower in agriculture, where a very large segment of the Soviet labor force continues to be employed. (See Table II.)

STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE

The Soviet pattern of resources allocation differs substantially from the pattern of allocation in the United States and in the other leading non-Communist countries. Apart

⁶ R. H. Reed, *Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employment in the USSR: 1950–1975* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census International Population Reports Series, P. 91, No. 15, 1967), pp. 15 ff.

⁷ *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*

from Japan, all the leading non-Communist countries allocate a larger proportion of their annual product to consumption than does the Soviet Union.

According to computations based on official Soviet input-output data, the share of inter-industry demands (the demands one industry makes on another) in the "gross social product" (the sum of all gross sectoral outputs) plus imports was of the order of 52 per cent throughout the 1960's and should remain at around this level in 1970. A significant change has, however, occurred within this overall share in respect to the demands of various sectors. The expanding sectors have been chemicals, electric power and certain modern industries, i.e., instrumentation, automation and guidance systems, whose claims on productive resources should increase further in the 1970's.

The final demands (consumer demands, plus investment goods and exports), 48 per cent of the gross social product, also underwent some notable changes. On the one hand, the relative share of capital formation has been increasing and, on the other hand, the relative share of household consumption has been decreasing, while that of public consumption has increased.

Foreign trade has grown vigorously—at an estimated average growth rate of 8.0 for exports and 7.4 for imports during the first half of the 1960's. According to the data based on Soviet input-output tabulations, the relative share of exports in consumption, investment and exports has remained on the order of 3.5 per cent and should rise to 3.8 per cent in 1970. Imports, on the other hand, have contributed to 3.7 per cent of the supply of productive resources to industry and to 5.3 per cent of the supply of resources to agriculture. Imports should continue to contribute heavily to the Soviet needs for machinery and chemicals, textiles and consumer goods.

The Soviet foreign trade turnover (exports plus imports) reached a total of \$16.7 billion in 1966, as compared to \$55.6 billion for the

United States.⁹ The Soviet Union traded for \$11.1 billion worth of goods with Communist countries, for \$3.4 billion with advanced industrial nations and for \$2.3 billion with underdeveloped countries. The structure of Soviet exports remained stable during the 1960's and should so continue during the early 1970's. Roughly 20 per cent of Soviet exports are now comprised of machinery and equipment, 70 per cent, of fuels and raw materials and 10 per cent, of grain and consumers' goods. On the other hand, roughly one-third of Soviet imports was made up of machinery and equipment, one-third, of fuels and raw materials and one-third, of consumers' goods.

Soviet trade with East Europe accounts for roughly 55 per cent of the total Soviet trade. Essentially, the Soviet Union delivers to these countries raw materials—particularly oil, iron ore, steel—and heavy industrial goods, and imports mostly machinery and equipment and consumer goods: Soviet imports of machinery and equipment from East Europe accounted in the 1960's for between 43 per cent and 46 per cent of the total imports from that area, and consumer goods for roughly 20 per cent. Thanks to both its exports to and imports from the area, the Soviet Union has an important economic leverage. As an exporter of oil to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the U.S.S.R. operates under favorable conditions since such exports are in demand also in Western markets. As an importer of East European machinery and equipment, the Soviet Union can obtain favorable conditions, since these products are not always up to Western standards and do not find buyers in Western markets.

Soviet trade relations with East Europe are first of all based on the political and military ties which link the area to the U.S.S.R. Any serious efforts to break those links, to turn any of these economies resolutely toward the West and to establish new patterns of trade elicit Soviet reactions which may develop into direct military intervention and occupation, as was the case in Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

⁹ See *Soviet Economic Performance*, pp. 97ff.

PROBLEMS OF SOVIET GROWTH

One of the basic problems of the Soviet economy as it enters the 1970's is its admitted low overall efficiency, i.e., its continuous need for large additions to plant and equipment and to the labor force to keep up a high rate of growth. Other crucial problems are the increasing marginal capital output ratios (i.e., the expanding needs of capital per unit of output), increasing claims on resources by military outputs, and rising inflationary pressures—i.e., higher rates of demand than planned because of rising unsatisfied consumer demand.

According to plan figures, consumer welfare should continue to improve in the 1970's. Nominal wages are scheduled to rise to 115.2 rubles per month in 1970, the last year of the current plan, a rise of 11.3 per cent over 1965. In order to understand the meaning of these figures, one must recall that *only in 1963 and 1965* did average real wages and salaries of Soviet workers and employees *reach the level of 1913 and 1928 respectively*. According to the computations of a French economist, J. Pavlevski, by 1970 the average real wage should exceed the 1913 level by 23 per cent and the 1928 level by 18 per cent. Throughout the comprehensive planning era, wages and salaries fell dramatically, reaching 58 per cent of the 1928 level in 1950. After a significant rise through the 1950's (wages more than doubled between 1950 and 1970), the preplanning era level of 1928 was finally reached in the early 1960's. (See Table III.)

**TABLE III: SOVIET AVERAGE
REAL WAGES 1950-1970**

1928	1940	1950	1960	1970 (planned)
100*	73	58	92	118
	100*	79	126	172
		100*	160	220

Source: "Le niveau de vie en Union Soviétique" (The Standard of Living in the U.S.S.R.), *Economie Planifiée*, Cahiers de l'ISEA, 1969, p. 360.

* 100 = base.

This evolution does not reflect the par-

ticularly rapid growth of the economy but rather the policy makers' priorities and their desire to keep investments at a high level, to satisfy the enormous demands on resources of the military, to keep a vast bureaucracy and, last but not least, to increase the share devoted to public consumption rather than that devoted to private consumption.

The average real wages of workers and employees still compare favorably to the average real earnings of a collectivized farmer. According to official figures, notwithstanding a dramatic increase in these earnings throughout the 1950's and 1960's, in 1966 the average monthly earning of a collective farmer was 34.3 rubles, that of a state-farm worker, 79.8 rubles and that of an industrial worker, 104.4 rubles. In other words, a collective farmer earned about one-third of an industrial worker's wage and a state farmer about three-fourths of an industrial worker's wage.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the further increases scheduled for 1970, the average worker's wage should still be twice as large as that of a collective farmer: this should continue to accentuate the exodus of youth from the countryside, an exodus which the state has tried to stave off but which was already well under way in the 1960's.

Low earnings in agriculture reflect numerous inefficiencies in that sector. But a crucial problem is the partial underemployment of agricultural labor and the lack of sufficient employment opportunities for such labor in industry. Now, for a number of

(Continued on page 237)

Nicolas Spulber has been a research associate at the Center of International Studies at M.I.T. He is the author of *The Soviet Economy* (New York: W. W. Norton, rev. ed., 1969), *Soviet Strategy of Economic Growth* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964), *The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe* (New York: Random House, 1966) and *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1957), and has served as editor or coeditor of six other books on socialist economies.

¹⁰ J. Pavlevski, "Le niveau de vie en Union Soviétique" (The Standard of Living in the U.S.S.R.), *Economie Planifiée*, Cahiers de l'ISEA, 1969, pp. 372ff.

"Khrushchev's successors were probably prompted to increase the scale of Soviet military preparations by the conviction that the U.S.S.R. must provide itself with a wider range of military options and divest itself of the liability of a markedly second-best strategic posture in any future Soviet-United States confrontations. . . ."

The Soviet Military Since Khrushchev


BY THOMAS W. WOLFE
Staff Member, The RAND Corporation

FIVE YEARS have passed since Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin came to power in the Soviet Union. These years have seen a number of significant developments affecting Soviet military power and its use in the service of Soviet policy. During this period, for example, the Soviet Union embarked upon a large-scale buildup of its strategic forces and pursued other military programs which have contributed not only to a notable shift in the United States-Soviet strategic balance, but to the further transformation of the U.S.S.R. from an essentially continental military power into a more truly global one. This period was marked also by Soviet resort to military intervention in Czechoslovakia as a means of arresting the erosion of Moscow's authority in East Europe, while new difficulties with China in the Asian borderlands underscored the need for shoring up the Soviet military position in the Far East. Finally, the approach of strategic arms limitation talks with the United States, after a long series of delays and postponements, was among other noteworthy developments as the fifth anniversary of collective rule under Nikita Khrushchev's successors drew near in October, 1969.

A few comments on change and continuity in Soviet military policy are perhaps necessary. In part, Soviet military policy has tended to reflect the differing conceptions

which have guided Soviet foreign policy under successive leaderships from Joseph Stalin to the present. In Stalin's time, the Soviet Union pursued a foreign policy of essentially continental dimensions, and its military policy remained oriented largely in a continental direction. In the Khrushchev era, by contrast, the Soviet Union began to break out of its continental shell to assert its influence and interests in every quarter of the world. However, under Premier Khrushchev, Soviet military power was never fully reshaped to support a political strategy of global dimensions. His successors, in effect, shouldered this task.

It may oversimplify matters to suggest that Khrushchev's successors merely set out in systematic fashion to correct various shortcomings in the Soviet military posture to match it more precisely with their foreign policy objectives. Military power and foreign policy can seldom be kept neatly in phase, for contingent factors tend to intrude. In the Soviet case, such factors include the organizational habits of the Soviet bureaucracy; the bargaining interplay among various elite groups; the constraints of resources, technology, geography and tradition; and the pressures exerted on Soviet decisions by allies and adversaries. Nevertheless, the general direction of Soviet military policy during the past five years seems to have stemmed from the regime's attempt to bring



By Russell H. Lenz, Chief Cartographer

—Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*.
© 1965 by the Christian Science Publishing Society. All rights reserved.

The Borders Of The Soviet Union

the Soviet Union's military posture into better line with its growing global obligations and interests.

In a more specific sense, the governing assumptions and priorities upon which the military policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has appeared to rest are: (1) that general nuclear war must be avoided; (2) that deterrence based on Soviet strategic-nuclear power, both offensive and defensive, offers the best guarantee against nuclear war; (3) that the Soviet Union must maintain its traditionally strong continental military position, both to back up its interests in the crucial political arena of Europe and to cope with the problems created by the rise of a rival seat of Communist power in Peking; and (4) that the Soviet Union must also continue to develop more mobile and versatile conventional forces—including Soviet naval and maritime capabilities—to support its interests in the Third World and to sustain its role as a global competitor of the United States. In essence, much the same set of assumptions underlay Khrushchev's military programs. What has distinguished the Soviet military preparations of the Brezhnev-Kosygin period from those of the Khrushchev decade, therefore, has been not their general direction, but their more substantial scale.

Khrushchev's successors were probably prompted to increase the scale of Soviet military preparations by the conviction that the U.S.S.R. must provide itself with a wider range of military options and divest itself of the liability of a markedly second-best strategic posture in any future Soviet-United States confrontations—a liability that was dramatically driven home by the Cuban missile crisis in the latter days of the Khrushchev decade. The war in Vietnam and a general Soviet belief that United States military power was being increasingly committed to the suppression of "national

liberation" movements in the Third World doubtless also persuaded the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime that further measures were needed to improve the Soviet Union's ability to project its military presence into areas like the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean.

In any event, despite the high priority set by the regime on major investment programs and reforms, the Soviet leaders found it expedient to make successive annual increases in the military budget after an initial "standpat" budget for 1965 of 12.8 billion rubles.¹ Thereafter, the figure mounted each year: 1966, 13.4 billion; 1967, 14.5 billion; 1968, 16.7 billion; 1969, 17.7 billion rubles. Turning now to the main features of the military programs which have sent Soviet defense outlays steadily upward, let us look first at the efforts of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to strengthen the Soviet Union's strategic posture.

THE STRATEGIC POSTURE

Soviet programs in the strategic field have fallen into two categories: those aimed at increasing the country's strategic delivery capabilities, and those directed toward improving its strategic defenses, including renewed emphasis on civil defense preparations. With respect to strategic delivery forces, the most dramatic development has been an almost five-fold expansion of the land-based I.C.B.M. force in the period from 1965 to mid-1969. This force now numbers about 1,050 launchers, the same level of land-based I.C.B.M.'s maintained by the United States for several years; when additional launch sites still under construction are completed in the next year or so, the Soviet force will apparently total more than 1,200 launchers, including about 250 large SS-9's.² The SS-9, a liquid-fueled missile capable of carrying a single warhead of up to 25 megatons-yield or several smaller multiple warheads, became the object of widespread attention when it was cited by United States Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in early 1969. During debate over the Safeguard missile defense system, he termed it

¹ See the author's "Soviet Military Policy at the Fifty-Year Mark," *Current History*, October, 1967, p. 209.

² *The Military Balance, 1969-1970*, The Institute for Strategic Studies (London), September, 1969, p. 5.

a weapon which posed a first-strike threat against the United States land-based Minuteman deterrent force.³

While expansion of the land-based I.C.-B.M. force has been the most conspicuous measure to strengthen the Soviet strategic delivery capacity, other delivery means have also received attention. A relatively high priority, for example, has gone to missile-launching submarines, as was made evident in 1968 with the introduction of a new class of nuclear-powered submarines with a ballistic-missile launching capacity—16 tubes—comparable to the United States Polaris-type submarine. A construction program for these new submarines at a rate of about seven per year⁴ suggests that the Soviet Union intends to enlarge its existing missile-launching submarine force, which in early 1969 numbered more than 75 submarines, or about one-fifth of the total underseas fleet.

The U.S.S.R. also continues to count on manned aircraft as an element of its strategic striking power, a contribution provided chiefly by a holdover force of long-range

bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles for "stand-off" attacks against enemy targets.⁵ Although no new development program for an advanced heavy bomber has been reported, long-range bomber training flights to northern coastal areas of the American continent in 1968–1969 gave testimony to the Soviet Union's interest in maintaining a manned-aircraft delivery system.⁶

In addition to these various operational delivery systems, the Soviet research and development effort fostered by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has yielded several new strategic delivery systems which are either in the very early stages of deployment or in a pre-operational testing stage. These include a solid-fuel I.C.B.M., roughly comparable to the United States Minuteman, for silo-emplacement; a mobile, solid-fuel I.C.B.M.; F.O.B.S., a fractional-orbital or depressed-trajectory delivery system;⁷ and the Soviet version of a multiple reentry vehicle, M.R.V., for which the SS-9 may be used as a booster.⁸

In the strategic defense field, not long after coming into office, the present regime took the first step in deploying missile defenses (the *Galosh* A.B.M. system) around Moscow. The installation of this system was accompanied by the construction of another defensive system, the so-called Tallin system, deployed over an extensive geographic area, including the northwestern approaches to the U.S.S.R. Initially, the Tallin program was believed to be an additional phase of A.B.M. deployment but by early 1968, Western officials stated that the system "most likely" was designed "against an aerodynamic rather than a ballistic missile threat."⁹ Should the future bear out this judgment, then obviously the Soviet A.B.M. program as it developed during the first years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime represented a much more modest start toward the formidable problems of missile defense than was originally thought to be the case. Incidentally, the addition of the Tallin system to an already massive array of air defenses—together with Soviet development of new long-range interceptor aircraft¹⁰—implies that even in the missile age Soviet

³ See testimony by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, *The New York Times*, March 21, 22, 1969.

⁴ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1969.

⁵ *The Military Balance*, 1969–1970, p. 8.

⁶ See "Soviet Bombers Patrolling around North America," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1969.

⁷ Soviet development and testing of FOBS was first made publicly known in November, 1967, by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. His successors, in their annual defense posture statements, have indicated that the FOBS system might be intended to deliver weapons with minimum warning time against soft targets like bomber bases.

⁸ The first Soviet test of a multiple reentry vehicle (M.R.V.) took place in August, 1968, according to Western sources. See "USSR: Closing the MIRV Gap," *Newsweek*, September 9, 1968. Several subsequent tests of the Soviet M.R.V., which was not known to have an independently maneuverable feature like the U.S. MIRV, took place before mid-1969.

⁹ Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969–1973 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, January 22, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 55.

¹⁰ Long-range interceptors in the Soviet air defense force in 1968 included the *Fiddler* and *Flagon-A*, while another, the *Foxbat* (NATO designations) was reported to be coming into operational use in 1969. See *The Military Balance*, 1969–1970, p. 6.

planners continue to give high priority to improving their strategic defenses against bomber attacks.

To return to the question of Soviet A.B.M. deployment, the United States proposal in early 1967 for talks on an A.B.M. moratorium apparently touched off an extended policy debate within the Kremlin on this and the associated issue of strategic arms limitation talks.¹¹ Not until June, 1968, after a delay of almost 18 months, did the Soviet Union finally agree to talks with the United States on A.B.M. and other strategic arms levels.¹² Precisely how the future of the Soviet A.B.M. program might be affected by the Kremlin's belated decision to explore the prospects of an A.B.M. moratorium was, however, not clear. On the one hand, in late 1968, work on the *Galosh* anti-missile system around Moscow apparently came to a standstill about two-thirds of the way toward completion, suggesting doubt in Soviet leadership circles about going ahead with more extensive A.B.M. deployment. On the other hand, the Soviet Union continued to pursue a high level of research activity in the A.B.M. field.¹³ And in early 1969, Soviet commentary on the controversy in the United States over United States plans for deploy-

ment of the Safeguard missile defense system included notably few arguments against the merits of missile defenses as such,¹⁴ suggesting that the Soviet Union may have wished to avoid compromising its own freedom of action with regard to further A.B.M. deployment.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Parallel to the investment of substantial resources in the buildup of strategic forces, the military policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has involved persistent efforts to improve the reach and mobility of conventional, or general purpose, forces. Perhaps the most significant developments have occurred in the field of sea power, where Khrushchev's successors have advanced the process of transforming the Soviet Navy from its past role as a mere adjunct to land power into an instrument for the global support of Soviet interests. According to Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, head of the Soviet Navy, the "leading place" in the buildup of Soviet naval power has been given to the submarine fleet (already the world's largest underseas force, with more than 350 submarines) and the naval air arm (a land-based force of some 850 aircraft). Although this order of priorities has not resulted in "balanced" naval forces in the Western sense, nevertheless the Soviet naval effort has been marked by a number of noteworthy innovations. These include:

(1) Renewal of a surface ship construction program, and the modernizing of many units in cruiser and destroyer classes to fire surface-to-surface and antiaircraft missiles, the latter suggesting an interest in preparing the surface forces to operate in waters beyond the protective range of Soviet land-based air cover;¹⁵

(2) The carrying out of regular patrols in distant ocean areas by Soviet submarines, including patrols off the coasts of North America, together with adoption of replenishment techniques at sea;

(3) The establishment since the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, of what appears to be a permanent naval presence of around

¹¹ For comment on this point, see the author's article in *Current History*, October 1967, p. 214.

¹² Soviet agreement to enter the talks was made known in a speech by Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko on June 27, 1968. See *Pravda*, June 28, 1968. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, caused postponement of the talks for another year.

¹³ Both United States Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, in the fall of 1968, and his successor, Melvin R. Laird, in early 1969, stated that, although further deployment of the *Galosh* system had been halted, research and testing of more sophisticated A.B.M. equipment was going forward at a rapid rate. See *The New York Times*, February 21, 1969.

¹⁴ A detailed examination of Soviet commentary on Safeguard may be found in Johan J. Holst, "The Russians and 'Safeguard'" (Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.: Hudson Institute), April 2, 1969.

¹⁵ The U.S.S.R.'s surface naval forces include some 20 cruisers, about 170 vessels classed as destroyers, frigates and destroyer escorts, upward of 100 amphibious ships and several hundred fast patrol boats. For more detailed treatment of Soviet naval forces, see *Soviet Sea Power* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University), June, 1969, especially pp. 31-65.

30 to 40 warships in the Mediterranean, and the showing of the flag through naval visits in such areas as the Indian Ocean, the West African coast and the Caribbean;

(4) The introduction of helicopter carriers, two of which have been completed since the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took office. Training exercises indicate that these vessels are to be used as antisubmarine warfare platforms; they may also be employed for vertical landing operations. The Soviet decision to adopt helicopter carriers does not appear to foreshadow the building of a force of attack aircraft carriers, however, without which some experts have questioned whether the Soviet Union can hope to lay down a worldwide offensive challenge to Western sea power;¹⁶

(5) Expansion of Soviet amphibious landing capabilities, both by the introduction of tank landing ships and the modest growth of naval infantry forces attached to the various territorial fleets. These forces, some of which have appeared in the Mediterranean basin well beyond their accustomed operating areas on the flanks of the Soviet ground forces, now number around 8,000 men;

(6) Finally, in the maritime field, there has been a steady growth of the Soviet merchant fleet from about 6 million deadweight tons at the close of the Khrushchev period to around 11 million deadweight tons today. Along with the further proliferation of trawler and oceanographic activities, this maritime growth provides useful logistics and intelligence adjuncts to Soviet sea power, which—in the words of its leaders—now has the task of looking after the worldwide “state interests” of the U.S.S.R., a notion which is new to the Soviet political vocabulary.¹⁷

¹⁶ A presentation of this thesis may be found in Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968).

¹⁷ See, for example, Admiral N. Kharlamov, “Guarding Our Country’s Maritime Boundaries Reliably,” *Moscow News*, No. 30, August 3–10, 1968, p. 3; Admiral V. Kasatonov, “Oceanic Guard of the Fatherland,” *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 28, 1968.

¹⁸ Andro Gabelic, “New Accent in Soviet Strategy,” reprinted in *Survival* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies), February, 1968, pp. 46–47.

Apart from these naval and maritime trends, the period since Khrushchev’s ouster has been marked by other developments bearing upon the mobility of conventional military power. These include improvement of Soviet airborne assault and reinforcement capabilities, as demonstrated both by Warsaw Pact field exercises since 1965 and by the role of airborne forces in the swift seizure of Prague during the August, 1968, intervention in Czechoslovakia. Lengthening of the Soviet Union’s air logistical reach also has been achieved with the introduction of new long-range heavy transport aircraft like the AN-22, and the massive air resupply operation to replenish U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s forces immediately after the Arab-Israeli war ended in June, 1967.

Perhaps the best example of the extension of the Soviet Union’s logistical reach far beyond its borders has been the case of Vietnam. Although airlift has played a minor role there, the Soviet performance in supplying Vietnam by sea and rail has furnished creditable evidence of the Soviet capacity to conduct a major and sustained logistical effort over long lines of communication, at least under conditions where military interdiction need not be faced.

One can by no means identify all of the developments sketched above as well-meshed parts of a purposeful long-range plan to acquire capabilities for active use in local conflicts beyond the U.S.S.R.’s borders. Some developments probably reflect an improvised response to particular crises; others are by-products of Soviet military and economic aid programs; still others are the outgrowth of efforts to achieve a more balanced military posture for use in the event of general war. But despite their varied origin, these developments do seem to suggest, as a Yugoslav strategic writer has put it, that the Soviet Union has begun to embark upon “a policy of countering the strategy of local and restricted wars” by providing itself with the kinds of military capabilities necessary to conduct “that selfsame local and restricted war.”¹⁸

THE CZECHOSLOVAK INVASION

The Warsaw Pact customarily has played a dual role in Soviet policy: first, as a military coalition to counter NATO and augment the Soviet Union's own military potential against the West; second, as an intrabloc mechanism to exert political control and discipline over potentially errant members of the Warsaw bloc. The latter function came to the fore during the Czechoslovak crisis and one of the more significant effects of the invasion was to restore the credibility of Soviet military power as the ultimate instrument of Soviet authority in East Europe. It would go far beyond the scope of this article to inquire into the full range of the motivations for and results of the invasion; here, one can only touch briefly on some of its military aspects, beginning with the question of how much weight military security considerations may have had in the decision to intervene.

According to some interpretations, the intervention was dictated less by an urge to snuff out a reform threat to ideological and political orthodoxy than to forestall a more concrete threat to the military security of the Soviet Union. If one were to speak in the narrow sense of military activities in the West against which the Soviet Union felt compelled to protect itself, then, in this observer's view, there are no grounds for ascribing the invasion to "genuine" Soviet security concerns. Not only did the NATO countries lean over backwards to avoid any semblance of military provocation during the Czech crisis, but long-term trends in NATO prior to the invasion had pointed toward a slackening of the alliance effort and the withdrawal of forces rather than toward a buildup

which might have looked threatening to the Soviet Union.

However, according to the Soviet concept of security in Europe, the need to preserve the ideological and political basis of the Soviet hold upon East Europe is so intimately linked with Soviet interest in maintaining a forward military position in this half of a divided Europe that it is difficult to distinguish where the one leaves off and the other begins. Because of Czechoslovakia's key location in the "northern tier" military structure of the Warsaw Pact, any possibility that she might renege on granting the Soviets future access to her territory, or that she might curtail her pact commitments, would doubtless have been disturbing to Moscow. In this sense, one may suppose that it was the possibility that Czechoslovak political evolution might lead toward a future military reorientation which carried some real weight in Soviet councils, and not any demonstrable evidence of a desire by Prague to renounce Czechoslovakia's military obligations to the Warsaw alliance.

The military aftereffects of the invasion were felt within both NATO and the Warsaw bloc. For its part, NATO was made uncomfortably aware of the capacity of the Soviet theater forces to carry out a large-scale coordinated operation in Central Europe, and the temporary influx of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia underscored the Soviet Union's potential for tipping the conventional arms balance in the European arena on short notice.¹⁹ Together with the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" used to justify the intervention,²⁰ the action against Czechoslovakia prompted the NATO allies to reappraise the state of their own defenses. Although it remains to be seen whether any long-term strengthening of NATO's posture will emerge, it appears that the Czech invasion helped to resolve NATO's doubts about the need for its existence and gave it a fresh sense of its relevance to European security.

Within the Warsaw Pact itself, one of the chief effects of the invasion was probably to shift a larger share of the joint security

¹⁹ For the Czech invasion, about 10 additional Soviet divisions, plus logistical and air support elements, were introduced into East Europe to augment the 26 Soviet divisions already in place there. Although the Soviet occupation force in Czechoslovakia was later reduced to about five divisions, the invasion itself demonstrated Soviet capacity to deploy large conventional forces in Central Europe under the cover of field exercises, which preceded the intervention.

²⁰ The "Brezhnev Doctrine" proclaimed the right of intervention to "save" communism despite allegedly "abstract" notions of national sovereignty.

burden to the Soviet Union. While the armies of four East European countries "co-operated" on a token basis in the invasion, the Soviet Union found it inadvisable to entrust them afterwards either with plugging the northern tier gap in the bloc's defenses or with occupation duties in Czechoslovakia—tasks that were left to Soviet forces instead. Despite the fact that the invasion served to reemphasize the U.S.S.R.'s dominant military role in the alliance, however, the Soviet Union appears to have remained in need of the multilateral framework of the Warsaw Pact. The pact serves as a device for keeping Soviet military forces deployed in East Europe and as a backstop for Soviet policy toward an increasingly troublesome China.

This was illustrated at the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Budapest on March 17, 1969, the first meeting since the Czech intervention seven months before. At this meeting, the Soviets accepted a number of organizational changes in the command structure of the pact, ostensibly meant to give other pact members a more meaningful voice in its affairs.²¹ Brezhnev reportedly also made an appeal to the Budapest conferees asking them to send "symbolic military detachments" to the Sino-Soviet border area to demonstrate Warsaw-bloc backing of the

Soviet Union.²² Although the appeal apparently had no immediate takers, it suggested that the need for a show of bloc solidarity against China had become a factor of some consequence in Moscow's eyes. Should the Soviet Union persist in efforts to enlist East European military cooperation against Peking—even on a symbolic basis—this would amount to a significant change in the original conception of the Warsaw Pact, widening its scope from an alliance facing westward against the NATO countries to one also facing eastward against a major Communist power.²³

THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS

Viewed in broad perspective, the evolution of Soviet military policy and programs under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime can perhaps best be regarded as part of a larger historical process—still under way—marking the Soviet Union's emergence as one of the world's two superpowers and reflecting the aspirations of Soviet leaders to share the global stage with the United States. A potentially significant landmark in this process may be provided by the strategic arms limitation, or SALT, talks with the United States, which seemed closer in August, 1969, after a delay of more than two and one-half years.

In essence, the talks represent a forum in which the outlines of the future Soviet-United States power relationship may be worked out. Although at this writing it is still too early to tell what may emerge from the tedious course of negotiation, the central question appears to be the following: After five years of strenuous effort to improve the

(Continued on page 240)

Thomas W. Wolfe spent two years as air attaché in Moscow (1956–1958). Among his many books on Soviet and international affairs are *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). He is coauthor of *Détente: Cold War Strategy in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1965), and *Peace and War in the Modern Age* (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

²¹ Communiqué of the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, *Pravda*, March 18, 1969.

²² See "Red Bloc Chiefs Meet for First Time Since Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1969; Anatole Shub, "Chinese Threat Obsesses Table-Pounding Brezhnev," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1969.

²³ Apart from Moscow's hopes of Warsaw Pact support, symbolic or otherwise, against China, it should be noted that the Soviet Union has also acted unilaterally to strengthen its military position in Asia vis-à-vis the Chinese. Following the Ussuri River border clashes in March, 1969, and other reported clashes along the Sinkiang border in May, the movement of Soviet reinforcements to the Far East apparently was stepped up, as suggested, among other things, by the closure of the Trans-Siberian railroad to foreign travel in the summer of 1969. At this writing, it is not possible to say whether Soviet military moves in the Far East are merely "prudential" or a form of political-military pressure on Peking, on the one hand, or whether on the other hand they reflect a belief in Moscow that a serious military confrontation with China may lie ahead.

"Maintaining the existing order, preserving and expanding acquired privileges—this is the platform on which the anti-Khrushchev coalition rose to power within the elitist circles that shape national policy in the U.S.S.R."

The Kremlin Scene: Politics in a Cul-de-sac

BY GEORGE GINSBURGS

Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

FIVE YEARS AGO, when Nikita Khrushchev was unceremoniously toppled by the Aleksei Kosygin-Leonid Brezhnev duumvirate, few people in the West imagined that the new leadership would last half a decade. In tone and complexion, it had all the earmarks of a caretaker cabinet, a bland front for the hidden forces that had engineered Khrushchev's downfall. The team's record of longevity now belies that thesis. What is indicated at this point is a careful second look at the ingredients which may account for its spectacular success in filling the seat of power.

In a way, the initial misreading of the nature of the present regime is understandable. The leaders who replaced Khrushchev appeared to have been picked less for their positive qualities than for the fact that they conspicuously lacked the attributes that had rendered their predecessor undesirable. Khrushchev had been picturesque, impetuous, unpredictable, temperamental, arbitrary, capricious. He was addicted to grandiose schemes and dramatic solutions and tended to pursue ambitious goals without adequate attention to and proper appreciation of the technical dimensions of his targets. He sought to play the role of an avant-garde ideological thinker and pioneered doctrinal formulas which had an uncanny knack of getting underfoot when he announced his next step. Worst of all, his constant tinkering

with the bureaucratic structure spread an acute sense of insecurity among party and government personnel; at the same time he had abolished the practice of police terror which in the past had served as an effective tool to check such disgruntled elements.

His heirs show none of these traits. They are somber, businesslike, humorless, pedestrian and conservative, and fit the prototype of the modern organization man. They dropped Khrushchev's style and stabilized the policy-making process. Gone were the old fanfare and panache. In their place, the mechanics of administrative routine keynoted the system's *modus operandi* both at home and abroad. Khrushchev's experimentations with dogma were shelved, and everybody reverted to the familiar and comfortable canons of classical Marxism. Formalized managerial channels supplanted personal fiat as the established method of regulation and control. And, finally, the spotlight began almost imperceptibly to shift from politics to economics.

However, while the flavor of public life in the Soviet Union underwent a radical overhaul, the new regime made few substantive changes in the far-reaching reforms introduced by Khrushchev in virtually all areas of social activity—with two prominent exceptions. The bifurcation previously imposed on the party apparatus, which had been split into two branches devoted, re-

spectively, to supervision over agricultural and over industrial affairs, was ended. The grid of councils and super-councils of national economy whose growth had imperiled the survival of the federal edifice in the U.S.S.R. was liquidated. There was a gradual eclipse of the companion venture to adopt a new constitution for the Soviet Union. The thrust of the move is highly suggestive, for it indicates precisely what supplied the vital catalyst to the mounting opposition to Khrushchev's rule, precipitated the confrontation between the rival camps and furnished the rebels with a combination of issues sufficiently broad to crystallize majority support for their bid for power.

Indeed, the division of the party unit into parallel cells had undermined the mandate and influence of the local party bosses, while the continuing concentration of rights and responsibilities in the hands of the councils of national economy and the creation of corresponding trans-republican organs had threatened to emasculate the original concept of federation and to lead to its abolition. When the project failed, its chief advocate was compelled to retire and the project was quickly dismantled. Resistance to Khrushchev had come from the large body of middle-rank government bureaucrats whose vested interests and future prospects would have been endangered by the elimination of this vast complex of employment and promotion. They were already edgy as a result of the 1961 endorsement of the principle of regular rotation of political cadres.

There were, of course, additional considerations that contributed toward Khrushchev's ouster. His ill-advised diplomatic and military gambles and his misestimation and aggravation of the conflict with China also counted against him, though only as secondary charges in the indictment. His successors have not been able to patch up the quarrel with Peking either; yet they have not lost their posts. The implication is that it was not the schisms with China per se that cost Khrushchev his job, but his own share in exacerbating the feud and becoming a personal obstacle to any possible accommo-

dation with the Mao group. In identifying the cause of the Sino-Soviet schism, Soviet spokesmen unanimously blame the Chinese. Thus as long as any Soviet leadership does nothing to make the situation worse, it is unlikely to face internal criticism for not ending the protracted dispute.

A NEGATIVE APPEAL

In sum, the decision to overthrow Khrushchev represented an essentially defensive domestic gambit by a cross section of party and government office-holders. They perceived in the man's character and attitude a risk to their tenured appointments and their hopes of further advancement, and they backed Kosygin and Brezhnev and their close associates in the anticipation that the latter would abandon Khrushchev's wild notions and return to the status quo ante. Maintaining the existing order, preserving and expanding acquired privileges—this is the platform on which the anti-Khrushchev coalition rose to power within the elitist circles that shape national policy in the U.S.S.R. The attractiveness of the present regime to those who were instrumental in tipping the scales in its favor boils down to the negative appeal of its commitment not to rock the ship of state. Apparently, after Khrushchev, Russia was in the mood for a bromide and, in general, this frame of mind has persisted.

Still, every administration needs a theme, and circumstances plus inclination led Kosygin and Brezhnev to try to ride the steed of economic progress. There is no denying that they have done well in this respect: the industrial plant has been pruned; wasteful enterprises have been shut down and prestige projects have been curtailed or cancelled outright; cost-accounting has been instituted to rationalize production; investment in the consumer sector and agriculture has increased; the gross national income and the individual's standard of living have both been climbing steadily and continued improvements may be expected. In short, impressive gains have been registered in the economic domain and the outlook for the years ahead holds promise of fresh achievements. Inso-

far as the current leadership has staked its claim on enhancing the quality of the country's economic performance, it has lived up to its pledge.

On the other hand, the course charted by the regime has bred a new and equally vexing constellation of problems. The switch to the bookkeeping system in industry has proceeded at a singularly slow pace: whether this is due to resistance on the part of subordinate management or to excessive caution at the upper echelons or to the sheer magnitude of the undertaking or to a combination of all three phenomena is not certain. In any event, the tradition-bound factory director has not warmed to the drift of the latest reform campaign, which places an extra load on the shoulders of the executive staff to push efficiency and show a net profit. Meantime, the "young Turks" are equally unhappy. The piecemeal approach to reorganization of the industrial aggregate prevents their theory from getting a fair hearing; in fact, such half-hearted application may destroy the essence of the plan. In objective terms alone, today's "mix" features all the vices of both worlds and the virtues of neither, and is generating its own internal tensions.

To an important segment of the junior generation—the aspiring scientists and technocrats—the current episode is not a mere experiment in administrative reapportionment but a crucial test. Its significance transcends the immediate issues of how best to streamline or refine the economic corpus that now functions in the U.S.S.R. and raises questions about the basic format of the mechanism and its social mission. Fascination with the dynamics of economic power carries with it an emotional attachment. The scientists and technocrats dream that they can unlock the secret that will trigger an explosion of creative energy of vast proportions. They believe that this will leave no doubt of the superiority of the socialist formula in meeting humanity's physical and spiritual requirements.

CONSENSUS POLITICS

The niggardly concessions the Soviet poli-

ticians have so far granted have only whetted the appetite of these enthusiasts and intensified their sense of frustration. The battlements of centralized control have refused to tumble; administrative interference remains pervasive; foresight, imagination and initiative still struggle to escape the dense jungle of bureaucratic regulations, limitations, prescriptions and prohibitions. The "revisionists" have won some freedoms; they have not attained their core goal. They have altered the Stalinist model; they have not transformed it. True, the ensuing hybrid owes much to their vision, but it conveys even more pungently the peculiar taste of consensus politics. For the sake of bare numbers, compromises are forged with a broad median range of competing interests, regardless of the intrinsic merit of the solutions being adopted. Each cluster collects a reward; none obtains what it really wants; an amorphous, "establishment-oriented" majority is strung together; and the hierarchy muddles on, dispensing favors to its followers and striving to keep its critics at bay.

The latter total a handful. Nevertheless, they do exist and they draw their recruits from two distinct quarters. The first element comprises all those who miss the pomp and ritual of the preceding era, who object to the erosion of the instinct of public discipline and the fading feeling of national unity and collective purposefulness induced by the climate of ideological mobilization. This group deplores the current reliance on crass material inducements and the loss of trust in the force of moral values and man's belief in a brighter future and his willingness—not to say eagerness—to incur sacrifices to achieve that end. Compared to the old days which evoked a panorama of desperate struggle, signal victories and dedication to a supreme cause copiously redeemed by human suffering, the contemporary scene strikes them as a harsh and ironic commentary on the epic deeds of the millions who fought and perished in the revolution and the civil war, in the vortex of collectivization and frenzied industrialization, in the holocaust of the great purges and the torment of World

War II. For the militant, the present pre-occupation with personal comfort and modern amenities and the conscious catering to private needs and whims spell the death of the ideals that had inspired individuals in every nook of the earth to pit the strength of their convictions against the dead weight of history.

INTELLECTUAL DISCONTENT

More articulate and vocal and, hence, more troublesome is the second source of dissent—the intellectual class. Its members, too, are disturbed by the pettiness of the prevailing mores at home, the decline of ideological momentum, the universal apathy which greets polemics on eternal verities or philosophical imperatives, and the common obsession with worldly possessions. However, the intellectuals have an added grievance that stems from the peculiar nature of their vocation. To understand the issues involved one must look again at the concept of “socialist realism”—the official Soviet yardstick for all works of art since the 1930’s.

In effect, most people tend to forget that at the time of its enunciation the maxim of “socialist realism,” for all its restrictiveness, was not an attempt to stifle the creative urge of Soviet writers, composers, and painters but an attempt to set their mode of expression in a special mold. The “real” milieu they were asked to portray had so little relation to the objective environment that it took genuine skill to confect palatable bonbons about the happy life of the Soviet citizen with a certain flair and an aura of sincerity. Perhaps the results did not rate as chefs d’oeuvre, although isolated samples may yet be recognized as notable contributions to their genre. The important point is that, regardless of the caliber of the work, the script demanded an impressive ability. One can glibly joke about the old line of “boy meets girl, girl meets tractor, girl marries tractor and rides off into the rosy sunset.” Nonetheless, to treat the theme in an interesting and credible manner did pose a major challenge and those who tackled the job and succeeded accomplished an enviable tour de force, whether or not the end product satisfied our esthetic notions of

good literature or music or the plastic arts.

In principle, the tenets of “socialist realism” continue to apply. But now Stalin’s heirs have destroyed its inner meaning by permitting a degree of truthful representation of social conditions in the U.S.S.R. with their quota of shortcomings, errors and flaws (although in the ultimate resolution virtue must still triumph). The magic spell is broken. To be allowed to project an authentic picture of a sliver of Soviet life and to be restricted to performing that exercise is to be condemned to naturalistic photography. Originally, to practice “socialist realism” was to perpetrate fiction on a grand scale; today, it smacks of lightly dramatized reporting.

Not surprisingly, some Soviet intellectuals have tried to shed this straitjacket and to venture into new paths. In these circles, the trend is to explore the individual, his experience and his psychic universe rather than to chronicle the logistics of the species or the abstract group. Insofar as they postulate man as the sole measure of all social conduct, these intellectuals champion the cause of humanistic liberalism. They preach that the infliction of pain and misery on a fellow creature in the name of higher values can never be justified. They believe that the act brutalizes him who commits the deed as much as his victim and scars the passive audience the same way; the adulteration of the means inevitably leads to the disfiguration of the ends.

The tragic element in the above scenario lies in the total breakdown of communication between the authorities and the “insurgents.” To officialdom, the “insurgents” are a disruptive element, stirring up unrest, chronically displeased with their lot and arrogant in their claim to propound a superior ethical code. Typically, the bureaucrats can only respond with heightened repression. To the

(Continued on page 238)

George Ginsburgs has taught at U.C.L.A. and the University of Iowa. He is the author of *Communist China and Tibet* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), *Soviet Citizenship Law* (Leyden: Sythoff, 1968) and many articles.

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies on the U.S.S.R.

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET POLICY, 1964–1968. By THOMAS B. LARSON. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. 280 pages, bibliography, appendices, and index, \$6.95.)

At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union stand at the crossroads of protracted discussions on strategic arms limitation, this excellent survey of Soviet attitudes and policies is welcome. Several introductory chapters discuss the relationship between domestic political developments and disarmament policies, the role of ideology as a constraint on cooperation with the West, and the post-Khrushchev setting. The author analyzes the complex and interrelated issues comprising the arms control package, and examines them against the political-military setting of East-West rivalry. The scholarship is sound, the writing is clear, and the analysis is sobering.

SOVIET CITIZENSHIP LAW. By GEORGE GINSBURGS. (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968. 270 pages, selective bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

Since 1938, the frontiers of the Soviet Union have undergone considerable alteration as a consequence of Moscow's absorption of vast areas. This has resulted in changes in the citizenship of millions of uprooted and conquered peoples. In this scholarly and comprehensive study, George Ginsburgs of the New School for Social Research traces the development of Soviet legislation pertaining to citizenship law since 1938. He examines the general principles underlying Soviet legislation and philosophy, the plight of people who became stateless, the situation of absorbed

populations in East Europe and the Baltic states, and the matter of dual citizenship. A subject of specialized interest, the material is presented against the historical-political setting of the post-1938 period.

REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA. EDITED BY RICHARD PIPES. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 365 pages and index, \$7.95.)

This volume is a collection of papers, comments and discussion reports focussing on the events of 1917, and the developments leading to the coming to power of the Bolsheviks. The contributors are many of the most distinguished European and United States specialists on the Soviet Union.

"The papers fall into three categories. One group is narrative, seeking to reconstruct and give some meaningful pattern to extremely complicated events. . . . Another set is essentially reflective and speculative: it inquires about the reasons for the revolution and the extent to which it has succeeded or failed to succeed in fulfilling its aims. There is also a third category of papers . . . constituting the bulk of the volume. It raises analytic questions of a specific kind: By what precise steps did Lenin arrive at his political philosophy? What was the political outlook of the men who took power in February 1917? . . ." Any student of the Bolshevik revolution will find this study rich in insights.

PRAGUE'S 200 DAYS. By HARRY SCHWARTZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1969. 274 pages and index, \$7.50.)

Czechoslovakia's dramatic search for a

democratic path to development within the framework of the Soviet camp is set forth in informative fashion by a veteran commentator for *The New York Times*. The author traces the course of liberalization from its halting, uncertain beginning in mid-1967, through the formative period of relaxation of secret police controls and of censorship in early 1968, through the halcyon days of freedom and tantalizing promise in late spring and early summer, to the Soviet intervention of August 21, 1968. The book offers a useful recapitulation of the key events, the major personalities and the determinants of Soviet behavior.

THE SOVIET MODEL AND UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By CHARLES K. WILBER. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969. 241 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

This study examines the strategy of economic development followed by the Soviet Union during its decades of industrialization; it does not, contrary to the title, make comparisons with developing countries, leaving this to the reader. Based primarily upon the research of leading Western scholars, the book skillfully examines the social and economic costs and policies adopted by the Soviet Union. Institutions and practices are examined. The second half of the study discusses the application of the Soviet approach to the development of Soviet Central Asia.

EAGLES IN COBWEBS: NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN THE BALKANS. By PAUL LENDVAI. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969. 396 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

Books on the Balkans are still a rarity, especially good ones. It is therefore a treat to read this informative, balanced account of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania. With clarity and skill, the author has admirably achieved his purpose:

"to examine processes of change in Balkan politics, which are complex and ambiguous, and to discuss how nationalism in a myriad of different forms affects political developments in interstate relations and within individual states."

He traces the reemergence of nationalism as a potent factor in the Communist countries of the Balkans. Born in Hungary, and a longtime journalist, he interlaces his analysis with anecdotes and local color. Lendvai believes that one-party Communist dictatorships will continue to rule in the Balkans, but that they will increasingly undergo important changes, which will promote the national revival of nation states.

THE GREAT FRIENDSHIP: SOVIET HISTORIANS ON THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES. By LOWELL TILLET, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969. 468 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

In this important and original work, Professor Tillet has addressed himself to the manner in which Soviet scholars have adapted their interpretations of Moscow's policies toward the non-Russian nationalities comprising almost half of the Soviet Union. The author stresses that the topic under consideration "is a study of Soviet historiography and not of historical fact." Further, he focuses only on pre-revolutionary (1917) history.

This study offers considerable new information on the treatment by Russian scholars of such nationality areas as the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Under pressure from the Communist party, Soviet scholars have rewritten past history to depict an idealized pattern of conflictless relationships between Russian and non-Russian nationality groups. It is not likely that these interpretations will soon end existing nationality tensions in the Soviet Union.

(Continued on page 239)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Statement of the World Communist Conference

On June 17, 1969, 75 Communist parties, meeting in Moscow, adopted a summary policy statement. Excerpts follow:

Mankind has entered the last third of our century in a situation marked by a sharpening of the historic struggle between the forces of progress and reaction, better socialism and imperialism. This clash is worldwide and embraces all the basic spheres of social life: economy, politics, ideology and culture.

At present there are real possibilities for resolving key problems of our time in the interests of peace, democracy, and socialism, to deal imperialism new blows.

However, while the world system of imperialism has not grown stronger, it remains a serious and dangerous foe. The United States of America, the chief imperialist power, has grown more aggressive.

The war in Vietnam is the most convincing proof of the contradiction between imperialism's aggressive plans and its ability to put these plans into effect.

In Vietnam, United States imperialism, the most powerful of the imperialist partners, is suffering defeat, and this is of historic significance.

The armed intervention in Vietnam holds a special place in the military and political designs of United States imperialism.

The aggressor planned to destroy an outpost of socialism in Asia, block the way for the peoples of Southeast Asia to freedom and progress, strike a blow at the national liberation movement, and test the strength of the proletarian solidarity of the socialist countries and the working people of the whole world.

The criminal intervention in Vietnam has resulted in considerable moral and political isolation of the United States.

It has turned ever broader masses of people, new social strata and political forces against imperialism and speeded up the involvement of millions of young people in many countries in the anti-imperialist struggle.

It has aggravated existing contradictions between the imperialist powers and created new ones.

The successes of the heroic Vietnamese people are convincing proof that in our day it is becoming increasingly possible for peoples resolutely using all

means to defend their independence, sovereignty and freedom and enjoying broad international support, to defeat imperialist aggression.

In the Middle East a grave international crisis has been precipitated by Israeli aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

Through this, imperialism, that of the United States above all, tried to crush the Arab countries, undermine the Arab liberation movement, and preserve or regain its position in the Middle East. This it has failed to do.

United States imperialism has not abandoned its plans to strangle revolutionary Cuba. It continues to threaten the independence of the Republic of Cuba and in flagrant contravention of international law tries to blockade it economically and carries on provocative and subversive activity against it.

In Europe, the North Atlantic bloc, the chief instrument of imperialist aggression and adventurism, continues to be active.

The axis of this bloc is the alliance between Washington and Bonn. Contrary to the will of the peoples of Europe, the ruling circles of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Britain are doing their utmost to prolong the existence of this bloc, strengthen its organization and maintain the military presence of the United States in Europe.

West German militarism, the main source of the war danger in the heart of Europe, was revived and grew strong mainly with NATO assistance.

The imperialist ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany, where neo-Nazism and militarism are gaining strength, persist in their revanchist program of revising the results of World War II and of changing the frontiers of a number of European countries.

This policy, aimed primarily against the German Democratic Republic, the first socialist workers' and peasants' state in German history, threatens the security of all European peoples and the peace of the world.

The Mediterranean countries occupy an important place in the plans of imperialism. United States imperialism, which has important military

bases in Spain, continues to support the Franco regime, thereby helping it to survive in opposition to the struggle of the fighting Spanish people.

The repeated exacerbation of the situation in Cyprus and the fascist coup in Greece are likewise the handiwork of the imperialists, who support the colonels' junta.

Imperialism has become more active in a number of African countries. It tries to halt the growth of the liberation struggle and preserve and strengthen its positions in that continent.

The British and French imperialists, and the imperialists of the United States, West Germany and Japan are making extensive uses of neo-colonialist methods of economic, political and ideological infiltration and subjugation.

The armed intervention in the Congo (Kinshasa), the reactionary coups in Ghana and some other countries, imperialist moves designed to dismember Nigeria, the political and military support given to reactionary and anti-national cliques, to the fascist and racist regimes in the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the fomenting of inter-state conflicts and inter-tribal strife, economic pressure and monopoly expansion—all serve to further imperialist plans.

The Portuguese colonialists, backed by NATO, try to keep their possessions by force of arms.

United States imperialism continues to step up its economic penetration, as well as its political, ideological and cultural intervention in the Latin American countries.

In alliance with the local reactionary forces it has been pursuing a policy designed to prevent the peoples from following the example of Cuba. It suppresses any step leading to economic and genuine political independence.

However, the policy of United States imperialism is encountering great difficulties. It fails to stabilize reactionary regimes or secure the agreement of all the governments to the setting up of the "inter-American peace forces." The Alliance for Progress program has failed.

Other imperialist powers, particularly West Germany and Japan, likewise seek to entrench themselves in that continent.

[The] West German imperialism war machine [is] reaching out for nuclear weapons and intensifying its drive for domination over Western Europe.

It opposes all steps leading to disarmament and the easing of international tension, and pursues a policy of neocolonialism and expansion in relation to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Despite the weakening of British imperialism, Britain remains one of the major imperialistic powers and strives to maintain its positions in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Middle East by neocolonialist methods and sometimes by direct military intervention.

On the principal issues of world politics Britain acts as one of the most active partners of the United States. It is a leading aggressive force in NATO and seeks a closer alliance with West Germany.

Japanese imperialism is gaining in strength, intensifying its expansion, first of all in Asia. Militarism is again rearing its head in Japan. Linked by many ties with United States imperialism, the ruling circles of Japan have virtually turned the country into a United States arsenal in the war against the Vietnamese people, and take part in conspiracies against the Korean people.

French imperialism tries to maintain and consolidate its positions in world economy and politics. It persistently continues to build up a nuclear strike force and refuses to join in measures that would promote disarmament.

It retains its colonial domination over the peoples of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and some countries of Africa and Oceania, and refuses to recognize their right to self-determination and to govern their own affairs.

It uses the influence it still has in its former colonies and, employing new methods of colonialist policy, is particularly active in Africa.

Italian monopoly capital is likewise stepping up its expansion.

The defense of socialism is an international duty of Communists.

The development and strengthening of each socialist country is a vital condition of the progress of the world socialist system as a whole. Successful development of the national economy, improvement of social relations and the all-round progress of each socialist country conform both to the interests of each people separately and the common cause of socialism.

One of the most important tasks before the Communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries is to develop all-embracing cooperation between their countries and ensure fresh success in the decisive areas of the economic competition between the two systems, in the advance of science and technology.

As the struggle between the two world systems grows sharper, this competition demands that on the basis of the socialist countries' fundamental interests and aims and of the Marxist-Leninist principles underlying their policy, the socialist system should place greater reliance on the international socialist division of labor and voluntary cooperation between them, which rules out any infringement of national interests, and insures the advance of each country and consolidates the might of the world socialist system as a whole.

Relying on its steadily growing economic and defense potential, the world socialist system fetters imperialism, reduces its possibilities of exporting

counter-revolution, and in fulfillment of its internationalist duty, furnishes increasing aid to the peoples fighting for freedom and independence, and promotes peace and international security.

As long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists, the Warsaw Treaty organization has an important role to play in safeguarding the security of the socialist countries against armed attack by the imperialist powers and in insuring peace.

The successes of socialism, its impact on the course of world events and the effectiveness of its struggle against imperialist aggression largely depend on the cohesion of the socialist countries. Unity of action of the socialist countries is an important factor in bringing together all anti-imperialist forces.

The establishment of international relations of a new type and the development of the fraternal alliance of the socialist countries is a complex historical process. Following the victory of the socialist revolution in many countries, the building of socialism on the basis of general laws is proceeding in various forms, which take into account concrete historical conditions and national distinctions.

Successful development of this process implies strict adherence to the principles of proletarian internationalism, mutual assistance and support, equality, sovereignty and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Socialism is not afflicted with the contradictions inherent in capitalism. When divergencies between socialist countries do arise owing to differences in the level of economic development, in social structure or international position or because of national distinctions, they can and must be successfully settled on the basis of proletarian fraternal cooperation; they need not disrupt the united front of socialist countries against imperialism.

Communists are aware of the difficulties in the development of the world socialist system, but this system is based on the identity of the socio-economic structure of its member countries and on the identity of their fundamental interests and objectives. This identity is an earnest that the existing difficulties will be overcome and that the unity of the socialist system will be further strengthened on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The cohesion of the Communist and workers parties is the most important factor in rallying together all the anti-imperialist forces.

The participants in the meeting reaffirm their common views that relations between the fraternal parties are based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, solidarity, and mutual support, respect for independence and equality, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Strict adherence to these principles [is] strengthening the unity of the Communist movement. Bi-

lateral consultations, regional meetings and international conferences are natural forms of such cooperation and are conducted on the basis of the principles accepted in the Communist movement.

These principles and these forms give the Communist and workers' parties every possibility to unite their efforts in the struggle for their common aims, under conditions of the growing diversity of the world revolutionary process.

All parties have equal rights. At this time when there is no leading center of the international Communist movement, voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased importance.

United action by Communist and workers' parties will promote cohesion of the Communist movement on Marxist-Leninist principles. Joint action aimed at solving vital practical problems of the revolutionary and general democratic movements of our time promotes a necessary exchange of experience between the various contingents of the Communist movement.

They help to enrich and creatively develop Marxist-Leninist theory, to strengthen internationalist revolutionary positions on urgent political problems.

The participants in the meeting proclaim their parties' firm resolve to do their utmost for the working people and for social progress, with the view to advancing toward complete victory over international capital.

They regard joint action against imperialism and for general democratic demands as a component and a stage of the struggle for socialist revolution and abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man.

The participants in the meeting are convinced that the effectiveness of each Communist party's policy depends on its successes in its own country, on the successes of other fraternal parties and on the extent of their cooperation.

Each Communist party is responsible for its activity to its own working class and people and, at the same time, to the international working class. Each Communist party's national and international responsibilities are indivisible.

Marxists-Leninists are both patriots and internationalists; they reject both national narrow-mindedness and the negation or underestimation of national interests, and the striving for hegemony.

At the same time, the Communist parties, the parties of the working class and all working people, are the standard-bearers of genuine national interests unlike the reactionary classes, which betray these interests.

The winning of power by the working class and its allies is the greatest contribution that a Com-

(Continued on page 241)

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN THE 1970's

(Continued from page 219)

reasons—including increased automation in certain industries—the demand for new manpower is declining: between 1952 and 1962, for instance, the rate of growth in industrial manpower was only half the rate of growth of this demand in the period 1928–1940. The possibilities of absorbing the rural exodus productively are therefore seriously limited, and will remain so, according to Soviet estimations, over the next 10 to 15 years.¹¹

CHANGES IN SYSTEM DESIGN

The problems of low overall economic efficiency, the declining growth rates in industrial output, the perennial difficulties in agriculture, the rising inflationary pressures and rising unsatisfied consumer demand particularly for “durables” (washing machines, refrigerators, television, cars) have prompted a number of significant changes in the organization of the Soviet economy since the mid-1960's. These changes, presented by certain Soviet writers as the most important *system* changes since the beginning of comprehensive planning in the late 1920's, aim at increasing overall economic efficiency, streamlining planning and sectoral operation to elicit a better and more productive responsiveness from managers and workers alike.

The reforms have taken place in two principal directions. One direction concerns planning methods and procedures—particularly the flow of orders from the top decision makers to the executants at the bottom of the production pyramid. The second concerns economic responsibility and initiative from below—particularly managerial motivation and incentives. In order to streamline, simplify and “de-bureaucratize” planning, orders from the top policy makers and planners have already been and will be further limited in

volume and diversity. Accounting procedures are to be standardized, and a national network of computers is to integrate the reporting of the various enterprises and the processing of the data by the State Statistical Agency and by the State Planning Committee.

In order to increase managerial responsibility and to avoid the wastage of state funds and the dispersal of investment, investment and working capital will be given to management not free of charge (i.e., as grants) but as repayable loans at a given interest rate. Furthermore, in order to stimulate management to produce in agreement with the patterns of consumer demand, managerial rewards will be tied to profits from actual sales (profits at state-fixed prices). Throughout the years ahead, both planning streamlining and management stimulation through rewards tied to profits should improve economic performance and help accelerate the Soviet Union's pace in its avowed race with the United States.

As the Soviet Union reaches higher and higher income levels during the 1970's, while maintaining consumption at levels barely superior to those which preceded the comprehensive planning era, the pressure of the consumers for more welfare—in short, for a better life, rather than for more military power—should grow in intensity. Will the policy makers simply tinker here and there with their system? Will they try to keep the lid on the pent-up pressures that have been accumulating since the beginning of the planning era—as they did for over 35 years (1928–1965)? Will they turn more decisively toward consumers' needs, as they have already started to do; but as yet timorously, since the mid-1960's? Or will they rather try to divert attention from domestic needs toward increasing expansion, not only in Europe (as they did immediately after World War II) but also (as they have been doing since the mid-1950's) along the Red Sea, toward the Middle East and the Indian Ocean? The options are clear. What is not yet as certain are the combinations among them which the Soviet policy makers will choose.

¹¹ See “Problems of Full Employment for Rural Manpower,” transl. from *Kommunist*, December, 1965, in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (1966), pp. 13 ff.

THE KREMLIN SCENE: POLITICS IN A CUL-DE-SAC

(Continued from page 231)

intellectuals, no positive solution is offered by the self-appointed censors; references to "socialist realism" have no further relevance; refusal to sanction artistic experimentation leaves its spokesmen with no viable alternative; the frantic defense of the status quo is pilloried as a naked symptom of mental bankruptcy and degeneracy.

In such a situation, each is persuaded that the other is behaving unreasonably, is guilty of bad faith and resorts to unfair tactics. Thus the stage is set for a blind, emotional confrontation. The majority, goaded to desperation by the failure of its efforts to silence or bribe the chorus of critics, unleashes the organized power of the state to crush the nucleus of overt dissent. And the minority, firm in its righteousness, courts martyrdom in the hope of escalating the conflict into a moral issue.

Actually, the contest is not nearly so one-sided as it sounds. The opposition can be muzzled. Some of its members can be carted off to penal colonies; the bulk can be hounded underground; a few can be cowed into cooperating. On the other hand, no government can afford to suppress the intelligentsia and deprive itself of the services of the class that can lend it legitimacy and respectability—qualities without which no leadership can function effectively. The men in the Kremlin are not unaware of the risk they run; they have tried to circumvent it by "going proletarian." The most ominous aspect of the recent trials of dissident authors may lie not in the incidental punishment visited on the accused, but in the recurrent official effort to portray the proceedings as a

showdown between "us, the honest toiling masses" and "them, the parasitic ingrates, the purveyors of fancy words, who batten on the labor of the working people while patronizing them for being less educated and lacking proper sophistication." The phenomenon of anti-intellectualism is not foreign to Soviet soil and this attempt to drive a wedge between the "literati" and the common folk follows a time-honored custom.

The stratagem may work for a while. At best, however, it is a temporary expedient—adequate if the purpose is simply to hold the line but of dubious value as a permanent device. Hired hacks can temporarily bridge the gap; but they cannot replace the original intellectuals. Meanwhile, the pressures are likely to mount. If there is any validity in the propositions that power corrupts, absolute power exonerates and mindless power merely repels, then in order to preserve its public image the regime must move to recapture the messianic impulse that midwived its birth, or achieve a mutually acceptable *modus vivendi* with its adversary—almost impossible feats. Or the regime can abandon all philosophical pretense and don the mantle of the modern bureaucratic state: a grotesque synthesis of brilliance in the spheres of science and technology and degradation in the realm of political culture: to summon Arthur Koestler's apt symbol, Prometheus reaching for the stars with an empty grin on his face.¹

On the other hand, an intramural coalition of economic and ethical "revisionists" may engineer a palace coup (as in Czechoslovakia), apply its energies to pulling the country out of the present doldrums and galvanize the population into action with the lure of a new dream. Is it possible that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was aimed at foreclosing this very contingency at home?

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST

(Continued from page 200)

nam, an exodus of United States forces could conceivably create new problems for Moscow's leaders. A post-Mao rapprochement,

¹ A further question: is technical efficiency the sole criterion of social worth? If the experience of the U.S.S.R. testifies to the affirmative, the traditional notion that moral truths justify political power is obsolete, and the Soviet system has produced the first authentic political mutant of the twentieth century.

however slight, between Peking and Washington would greatly upset the men in the Kremlin.

Soviet diplomats showed their considerable apprehensiveness when the Chinese suggested a continuation of the Warsaw talks, relaxing only when Peking reneged. The Politburo's former attempt to win Peking's sympathy by supporting the Vietnamese Communists fizzled, particularly after China's cultural revolution. Soviet help to Hanoi, while gladly accepted, did not lead to an extension of Soviet influence; North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh has continued his policy of fence-sitting between Moscow and Peking.

From the Soviet point of view, a Chinese encroachment on Southeast and South Asia would be intolerable. The maintenance of Indian and Pakistani neutrality remains an important goal of Soviet South Asian policy—as long as nothing better can be obtained. So strongly do the Soviets feel about China's influence in these areas that they have suggested "containment," Kremlin style, in the form of a security pact—obviously directed against China—comprising Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, India and Pakistan. This projected Soviet version of an Asian "NATO" had its beginnings a few years ago when regional alliances in Asia were suggested by Moscow. The new project was surfaced by Brezhnev on June 7, 1969, during the international Communist meeting in Moscow. How such a security pact, on which the Soviets may be expected to work hard during the 1970's, would affect the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, at least in Chinese eyes, is open to question. This treaty has never been formally renounced.

The leadership in Peking has already attacked the notion of an Asian collective security system in its propaganda, well realizing that it is directed against mainland China.

THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

As for Sino-Soviet relations, the 1970's may become a watershed. The nature of the Peking-Moscow quarrel will greatly influence Soviet decisions toward its satellites, the West

and the Third World. It is unlikely that Mao will outlive the next ten years. His military successors may well reevaluate his policies and attempt a rapprochement with the Soviet leaders, who would be happy to meet the Chinese halfway. Should this succeed, in one form or another, Soviet policy would become dangerously harsh toward the West. In such an eventuality, the Kremlin's position would be immeasurably fortified and, as a result, polycentric communism might be reversed. Even if Sino-Soviet relations continue to be troubled, war between the Russians and Chinese is not likely. Yet while the Chinese threat hangs over the heads of the Soviet rulers, their reactions toward the rest of the world will be restrained.

The overall outlook, regrettably, is not particularly encouraging, except for the likelihood that the nuclear deterrent will continue to be operative—provided the United States keeps its powder dry and does not undertake unilateral disarmament.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 233)

MISCELLANY

SUN YAT-SEN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. BY HAROLD Z. SCHIFFRIN WITH FOREWORD BY JOHN K. FAIRBANK. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968. 412 pages, \$9.50.)

This is a definitive study of the life and work of a remarkable, if enigmatic, revolutionary leader acclaimed by both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party as the national father. Based on a wealth of primary source materials, this succinctly written book is required reading for those interested in the cause and process of the disintegration of old China and the course of revolutionary change around the turn of the century.

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE THIRD WORLD

(Continued from page 206)

Morocco, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to provide for regular consultations and planning.

Thus far, the most successful examples of economic integration have been the 1963 and the 1966 Soviet agreements with Afghanistan and Iran, whereby Soviet credits are repaid by the shipment of natural gas to the fuel-short Soviet Central Asian republics. Cooperation in manufacturing has been undertaken on a smaller scale than cooperation in the extractive industries. The Soviet Union is receiving high quality cotton yarn from textile mills it helped set up in the U.A.R. Soon it will be receiving shoes from Indian factories set up specifically to cater to the Soviet market.

The Chinese have been quick to denounce this new trend, claiming that the Soviet Union seeks to exploit and plunder the developing countries. Joint production ventures in India are described as investments designed to exploit cheap Indian labor, techniques and raw materials.¹¹

Regardless of financial benefits, Moscow evidently considers well-coordinated and executed economic penetration a more durable and dependable source of influence than political infiltration. Algeria demonstrates that where extensive economic aid has been sensibly planned and implemented, the overthrow of a pro-Soviet regime does not necessarily lead to the collapse of an alliance. Even though pro-Communist ideologues no longer participate in Algerian politics, Soviet advisers continue to be active in Algerian economic life and the country has not become pro-Western.

The current Soviet reliance on traditional levers of power to gain influence in the Third World has paid off handsomely. The success of this reversion to normal international behavior was in part facilitated by the contrast

it presents to Chinese and Cuban militancy. By soft-pedaling ideology, by acting as honest brokers in international disputes and as correct diplomats and beneficial economic partners, by denouncing China for fomenting interstate conflict and internal strife, the Soviets have created an image of respectability. Most new states no longer fear Soviet interference in their domestic affairs.

But as the Soviets have gained wider acceptance and influence, they have lost their claim to moral superiority. In the eyes of the developing world, the Soviet Union is now one of the two superpowers. The Soviet Union objects to being classified as just another rich, industrial country. Yet Chinese propaganda that the Soviet Union has become a satisfied white power, no longer interested in helping the struggling, underdeveloped nations, has struck a responsive cord.

The Soviet Union now has at its disposal all the instruments of a great power. But should unstable political and economic situations in the Third World deteriorate so that extremist leaders and doctrines take over, the revolutionary appeals of Communist China might well count more than Soviet power.

THE SOVIET MILITARY SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

(Continued from page 227)

Soviet position vis-à-vis the United States in the major elements of strategic power, are the collective leaders in the Kremlin now satisfied to settle for putative parity, and to seal such a relationship with mutual agreement on force levels? Or are the men in control of Soviet policy bent upon pursuing further the programs by which the Soviet Union has gradually whittled down the strategic margin of its main Western adversary, and are they therefore likely to prove less interested in curbing the strategic arms competition than in trying to manipulate it to Soviet advantage? Perhaps the answer to this pivotal question may be found in the Soviet-American dialogue that develops as the SALT talks unfold in the months ahead.

¹¹ "Soviet Revisionism's Neo-Colonial Aid," *Peking Review*, September 26, 1967, pp. 26-29.

EAST EUROPE: THE POLITICS OF RECOVERY

(Continued from page 212)

committee, which ground out a 43-page statement and set a June date for the meeting. All of the world's 100-odd Communist parties were invited; 75 attended. However, of the 14 states ruled by Communist parties, representatives of five were missing: Albania and Yugoslavia from East Europe; Red China, North Korea and North Vietnam from the Far East. Rumania attended, after receiving assurances from the Soviets that the Chinese would not be criticized at the conference. When this promise was broken, Rumanian President Ceausescu protested publicly, and signed the conference declaration only with formal reservations.

The declaration was clearly worded to avoid offense.⁴ Far from recognizing Soviet primacy, it specifically stated that "there is no leading center of the International Communist Movement." Similarly, it contained no condemnation of Chinese views or actions, nor did it endorse the Warsaw Five invasion of the preceding summer.

Looking back over Soviet policy toward East Europe during 1968-1969, and trying to see it through Soviet eyes, one would be hard-pressed to call it bold or imaginative. Forced to cope with a self-created setback, the Soviet Union improved relations with East Europe, employing a judicious mixture of military force, economic inducement and intensive diplomacy—all part of a familiar pattern. One has the feeling that all this was very much the work of a committee composed of men whose conservative cast of mind was very little affected by the Czechoslovak crisis, whose chief concern was for stability and "normalization" and whose major attention, in any event, was elsewhere—on the Sino-Soviet conflict, on the Western Alliance, perhaps even on domestic problems.

⁴ For excerpts from this declaration, see pp. 234 in this issue.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 236)

unist party fighting under capitalist conditions can make to the cause of socialism and proletarian internationalism.

The Communist and workers' parties, regardless of some difference of opinion, reaffirm their determination to present a united front in the struggle against imperialism.

Some of the divergences that have arisen are eliminated through an exchange of opinion or disappear as the development of events clarifies the essence of the outstanding issues. Other divergences may last long.

The meeting is confident that the outstanding issues can and must be resolved correctly by strengthening all forms of cooperation among the Communist parties, by extending interparty ties, mutual exchange of experience, comradely discussion and consultation and unity of action in the international arena.

It is an internationalist duty of each party to do everything it can to help improve relations and promote trust between all parties and to undertake further efforts to strengthen the unity of the international Communist movement.

STATEMENTS ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES

In early March, 1969, Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on the borders of the Ussuri River. Excerpts from the official government statements follow:

THE SOVIET STATEMENT

The armed provocation by the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese border evoked the justified wrath and indignation of all Soviet people. The brazen gangster raid on the Soviet border guards was received everywhere in the world as another manifestation of the adventuristic policies of the present Chinese leadership, its irresponsible gambling with human lives for the sake of its plans and designs.

Repeating the tested devices of international provocateurs, the Chinese authorities try to distort the facts, to shirk responsibility for the perpetrated provocation to shift the blame to the Soviet Union. They want their people to believe that it is not the Chinese side that is to blame for the blood shed on the Ussuri River. Yet facts remain facts, however hard they try to juggle them in Peking. Here is what actually happened:

On the night of March 1-2, about 300 armed

Chinese soldiers, having violated the Soviet state border, crossed over an arm of the Ussuri River to the Soviet island of Damansky.

The group, camouflaged in white gowns, dispersed on the above island in the woods and shrubbery behind a natural elevation of the terrain, and lay in ambush. Concentrated on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River were military units and weapons—mortars, grenade throwers and large-caliber machine guns. Field telephone lines were laid between the group sent to Damansky Island and the military units on the Chinese bank.

At 4 hours 10 minutes, another 30 armed Chinese intruders crossed the state border of the U.S.S.R. and made for Damansky Island. A group of Soviet border guards led by the station commander, Senior Lieut. Strelnikov, went out along the ice of the Ussuri River toward the site of the border violation.

As had happened before, the Soviet border guards intended to state a protest to the Chinese over the violation of the border, and expel them from the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet border guards suddenly came under treacherously opened fire, and were literally shot at point-blank by the Chinese provocateurs. Artillery and mortar fire was opened at another group of Soviet border guards from the Chinese bank.

Together with reinforcements which arrived from a neighboring border guard station, the Soviet border guards, displaying courage, bravery and gallantry, by resolute action expelled the intruders from Soviet territory.

Facts show that the Chinese provocation in the region of Damansky Island was deliberately planned beforehand. It was carried out by forces of army units specially trained for the provocation.

An inspection of the Soviet territory at the site of the battle detected mortar-shell stabilizers, the fragments of shells and grenades and Chinese firearms and military equipment abandoned by the fleeing intruders.

Extreme Cruelty

In the course of the provocation the Chinese servicemen displayed extreme cruelty and brutality in respect of the wounded Soviet frontier guards. It was established by an on-the-spot investigation and by a medical commission that inspected the corpses of the dead Soviet frontier guards that the Chinese had fired point-blank at the wounded and bayoneted them. The faces of some killed Soviet soldiers were so mutilated that they became unrecognizable.

The actions of the Chinese in respect to the Soviet frontier guards can be compared only with the most blood-curdling brutalities perpetrated by the Chinese militarists and Chiang-Kai-shekists during armed conflicts in the 1920's and 1930's.

The gangster raid organized by the Chinese authorities took the lives of 31 Soviet border guards, while 14 others received wounds. The Soviet border guards courageously and selflessly did their duty, as they defended the inviolability of the borders of their Soviet socialist motherland.

The armed intrusion into Soviet territory was followed by a new wave of anti-Soviet hysteria and nationalistic psychosis that started on command in China. Crowded, organized gatherings with the participation of servicemen resound with anti-Soviet slogans and threats. Beginning from March 3 the Soviet Embassy in Peking has come under siege, in the full sense of the word, by groups of hooligans.

Why did the Mao Tse-tung group want this armed provocation and the political hullabaloo accompanying it?

These criminal actions by the Mao Tse-tung group pursue far-reaching aims. The Maoists are trying to create such an atmosphere in their country that would allow them to divert the Chinese people's attention from the big economic and political failures inside the country, and give them a chance to assert Mao Tse-tung's great-power adventurist course directed at a further worsening of relations with socialist and other peace-loving countries.

Timing of Attack

Of course, it is not by chance that the provocation on the Soviet-Chinese border was staged in the period of preparations for the ninth C.P.C. [Chinese Communist Party] congress. It is evidently expected that in an atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria it will be easier to impose on the congress a platform hostile to the Soviet Union and the C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and to give anti-Sovietism the status of state policy.

There are, of course, certain quarters in the world that would like to benefit from such provocations. It is not fortuitous that the armed bandit attack in the area of Damansky Island has found response among reactionary quarters of the United States and West Germany, which are beginning to estimate openly what possible benefits they could get from tension on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Soviet people have not and do not equate Mao Tse-tung's group with the Chinese people. Our country has always proceeded from feelings of friendship in relations with the Chinese people.

But at the same time, as it was already pointed out in the Soviet Government's note to the P.R.C. Government, the reckless provocation actions of the Chinese authorities will be met from our side with a proper rebuff and will be resolutely cut short. All responsibility for the possible consequences of the adventurist policy of China's leadership directed at aggravating the situation on the

border between China and the Soviet Union rests with the government of the Chinese People's Republic.

THE CHINESE STATEMENT

On March 2, 1969, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique sent out large numbers of armed soldiers who intruded flagrantly into Chenpao Island on the Ussuri River in Hulin County, Heilungkiang Province, China, and launched a sudden attack on our frontier guards on patrol duty, killing and wounding many of them. It has thus committed a new grave crime against the Chinese people and incurred another debt in blood. The army men and civilians of our country in their hundreds of millions have expressed deepest indignation at this.

However, after the incident, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, calling black white and confusing right and wrong, described China's Chenpao Island as part of Soviet territory and the Soviet revisionist armed troops' intrusion into Chinese territory and their attack on Chinese frontier guards as the crossing of the Soviet state frontier by Chinese frontier guards to attack Soviet frontier troops. This is sheer nonsense!

Border History

Chenpao Island has always been Chinese territory. The "Chinese-Russian treaty of Nerchinsk" of Sept. 8, 1689, stipulated that the Argun River, the Gorbitza River and the Outer Khingan [Stanovoi] Mountains form the eastern sector of the Chinese-Russian boundary and that the vast areas north of the Heilungkiang [Amur] River, south of the Outer Khingan Mountains and east of the Ussuri River are all Chinese territory.

The Ussuri River where Chenpao Island is situated was then an inland river of China. While the allied British-French imperialist troops were attacking Tientsin and threatening Peking in their aggression against China, Czarist Russian imperialism seized the opportunity to compel the authorities of the Ching [Manchu] dynasty by armed force to sign the unequal "Chinese-Russian Treaty of Aigun" on May 28, 1858, by which it annexed more than 600,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory north of the Heilungkiang River and placed some 400,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory east of the Ussuri River under the joint possession of China and Russia.

Again taking advantage of the military pressure brought about by the British-French imperialist war of aggression against China and after the occupation of Peking by the British and French aggressor troops, Czarist Russian imperialism forced the Government of the Ching Dynasty to sign another unequal treaty, the "Chinese-Russian Treaty of

Peking," on Nov. 14, 1860, by which it forcibly incorporated all the Chinese territory east of the Ussuri River into Russia.

As Marx pointed out in 1857 and 1858, the Opium War of 1840 was followed by "the successful encroachment of Russia from the north on China, and Russia took possession of the banks of the River Amur, the native country of the present ruling race [the Manchus] in China."

Furthermore, after the signing of the "Chinese-Russian Treaty of Aigun," Engels penetratingly pointed out: "When at last England resolved to carry the war to Peking, and when France joined her in the hope of picking up something to her advantage," Russia despoiled "China of a country as large as France and Germany put together, and of a river as large as the Danube."

Lenin's Statement

Lenin also pointed out that the task of the Russian imperialist policy in Asia was "to seize the whole of Persia, complete the partition of China." By these brilliant conclusions, Marx, Engels and Lenin fully exposed the aggressive and unequal nature of the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun" and the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" Czarist Russian imperialism had imposed on China.

Even according to the unequal "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking," Chenpao Island is indisputable Chinese territory. The "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" stipulated: "From the estuary of the Ussuri River southward to the Hsingkai [Khanka] Lake, the boundary line runs along the Ussuri and Sungacha Rivers. The land lying east of these rivers belongs to Russia and the land west of these rivers belong to China."

According to established principles of international law, in the case of navigable boundary rivers, the central line of the main channel should form the boundary line that determines the ownership of islands. Chenpao Island and the nearby Kapotze and Chilichin islands are all situated on the Chinese side of the central line of the main channel of the Ussuri River and have always been under China's jurisdiction.

Chinese frontier guards have always patrolled these islands and Chinese inhabitants have always carried on production on these islands. During the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations in 1964, the Soviet side itself could not but admit that these islands are Chinese territory.

On Sept. 27, 1920, the Soviet Government led by Lenin declared that "all the treaties concluded by the previous Russian Government with China are null and void, and it renounces all the seized Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and returns to China gratis and forever everything the Czarist Government and the Russian bourgeoisie seized rapaciously from her."

This great testament of Lenin's failed to come true because China was then ruled by a reactionary government.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the boundary question between China and the Soviet Union could have been reasonably settled.

The Chinese Government consistently holds that boundary questions left over by history should be settled through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be maintained.

The Government of China has, in succession, satisfactorily settled complicated boundary questions left over by history with her neighboring countries, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia and Afghanistan.

But the boundary questions between China and the Soviet Union and between China and India have remained unsettled. The Chinese Government repeatedly held negotiations with the Indian Government on the Chinese Indian boundary question, but they were disrupted by the Indian reactionaries.

In 1964 the Chinese Government held boundary negotiations with the Soviet Government, during which the Chinese side made it clear that the "Chinese-Russian Treaty of Aigun," the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" and other treaties relating to the present Chinese-Soviet boundary were all unequal treaties Czarist Russian imperialism imposed on China when power was not in the hands of the peoples of China and Russia.

But, prompted by the desire to strengthen the revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the Chinese side was willing to take these treaties as the basis for determining the entire alignment of the boundary line between the two countries and for settling all existing questions relating to the boundary; any side that occupies the territory of the other side in violation of the treaties must, in principle, return it wholly and unconditionally to the other side, but this does not preclude necessary readjustments at individual places on the boundary by both sides on the basis of the treaties and in accordance with the principles of consultation on an equal footing and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation.

Refusal to Negotiate

However, the Soviet side refused to accept the above-mentioned reasonable proposals of the Chinese side. It refused to recognize the treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary as unequal treaties and obstinately refused to take these treaties as the basis for settling the boundary question between the two countries in its vain attempt to force China to accept a new unequal treaty and

thus to perpetuate in legal form its occupation of the Chinese territory that it seized by crossing the boundary line defined by the unequal treaties.

This great-power chauvinist and territorial expansionist stand of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique was severely condemned by the Chinese side. The Chinese side clearly pointed out that if the Soviet side should obdurately insist on such a stand and inexorably refuse to mend its ways, the Chinese side will have to reconsider its position as regards the Sino-Soviet boundary question as a whole.

Not only has the Soviet revisionist renegade clique refused to settle the Sino-Soviet boundary question through negotiations, but it has incessantly disrupted the status quo of the boundary and created border incidents.

After the Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations were sabotaged by the Soviet revisionists, and particularly since Brezhnev and Kosygin, motivated by counterrevolutionary needs for allying with United States imperialism against China and diverting the attention of the people at home, [they] have sent reinforcements to the Sino-Soviet border, stepped up disruption of the status quo of the boundary, occupied still more Chinese territories, carried out armed provocations and created incidents of bloodshed.

Take Chenpao Island for instance. During the ice-bound seasons in the two years and more between Jan. 23, 1967, and March 2 of this year alone, Soviet frontier troops intruded into the Chenpao Island area of China on 16 occasions, and during several of these intrusions they wounded Chinese frontier guards on normal patrol duty and looted Chinese arms and ammunition.

The latest incident in which Soviet revisionist troops intruded into the Chinese territory Chenpao Island to carry out armed provocations has further revealed the ugly features of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, which has taken over the mantle of Czarist Russian imperialism and is pursuing its social-imperialist policy of aggression.

They regard as theirs those places which Czarist Russian imperialism once occupied and have made further claims for places which Czarist Russian imperialism failed to occupy. They are the new Czars of today.

It is absolutely impermissible for anyone to violate China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. Should the Soviet revisionist renegade clique cling to its reckless course and continue to provoke armed conflicts on the border, the Chinese people, following the teaching of our great leader Chairman Mao, will certainly wipe out the invading enemy resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Aug. 12—At an 18-hour emergency ministerial meeting, uniform support levels for farm prices are suspended. The move is made necessary by the devaluation of the French franc.

Latin America

Aug. 1—A conference on coastal fishing rights opens in Argentina. Participants represent the U.S., Chile, Peru and Ecuador. At issue is territorial sovereignty over the 200-mile offshore limit claimed by the Latin American countries. The U.S. recognizes only a 12-mile limit.

Aug. 19—The conference on fishing rights is adjourned for several months. The main points at issue have not been resolved, although participants express optimism over the outcome of future talks.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Syria*)

Aug. 3—A committee of 5 members of Israel's governing Labor party, including 3 Cabinet ministers, declare that Israel will retain the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and part of the Sinai Peninsula to protect her security.

Aug. 4—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan says that Soviet military advisers are supervising the day-by-day attacks made by U.A.R. troops against Israeli forces.

Aug. 11—Israeli jets strike at Arab guerrilla encampments in Lebanon following a series of raids originating from Lebanon.

Aug. 13—An exchange of tank and artillery fire occurs across the Suez Canal. Israeli jets strike U.A.R. gun emplacements.

Aug. 14—Israeli army sources announce the arrest of 30 Arabs in the Jerusalem area for shooting Arabs who have cooperated with Israeli occupation personnel.

Aug. 15—Arab saboteurs plant explosives which cut a pipeline in Haifa and start an oil fire.

Aug. 19—An Israeli jet is shot down and its pilot captured by U.A.R. forces during a raid over the Suez Canal.

Aug. 20—Fire destroys the Mosque of Al Aksa in Jerusalem.

Aug. 22—Michael Dennis William Rohan, a wandering sheep shearer from Australia, is arrested for setting the Al Aksa Mosque fire. Evidence leading to the arrest is presented by the Muslim community to Israeli police.

Aug. 23—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser calls for an all-out war against Israel, blaming Israel for the Mosque fire and saying Arabs will be "soldiers of God." Agitation is encouraged in other Arab countries.

Aug. 26—Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli representative to the United Nations, denounces the U.N. Security Council's unanimous vote condemning Israel for the August 11 air attack on Lebanon. Tekoah calls the vote a new example of the double standard which condemns Israeli reprisals but does not condemn the Arab raids that cause them.

Aug. 28—The Israeli army announces it has attacked a regional U.A.R. military base about 160 miles inland from the Gulf of Suez.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Aug. 13—Francis Roussilhe, a 40-year-old

Frenchman who works as a translator at the Brussels headquarters of NATO, is arrested for espionage and charged with treason. He is accused of giving secret NATO documents to an unnamed East European country.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

Aug. 20—The membership of the O.A.S. is increased to 24 when Jamaica's ratification of the O.A.S. charter is deposited in Washington, D.C.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 2—A plan for the Second Development Decade which begins in 1971 is set forth by the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The plan urges help to the developing nations in farming, self-help projects and birth control.

Aug. 12—South Africa is condemned by the Security Council for its defiance of the U.N. in continuing to control South-West Africa.

Aug. 20—The request by the government of Eire to place the violence in Northern Ireland on the agenda of the Security Council is rejected by Council vote.

Aug. 27—The Security Council agrees in principle to study the problem of "mini-states"—those nations too small and too poor to carry full U.N. responsibility.

War In Vietnam

(See also *U.S., Military*)

Aug. 4—The Hanoi government announces the release of 3 U.S. servicemen.

Aug. 6—8 men in the U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets) are charged with murder in the fatal shooting of a Vietnamese. One of the arrested men is the former commander of the Fifth Special Forces Group.

Aug. 7—Duong Dinh Thao, spokesman for the provisional revolutionary government formed by the Vietcong, says his group has begun talks with other groups inside and outside South Vietnam in an effort to form a coalition regime.

Aug. 8—Fighting in South Vietnam, which has been at a lull for nearly 2 months, increases in intensity.

Aug. 12—North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops attack more than 100 bases and towns in stepped-up fighting.

Aug. 13—South Vietnamese and U.S. troops launch a wide counteroffensive against enemy units that shelled their positions earlier in the week.

Aug. 16—U.S. military sources say most sophisticated U.S. equipment will not be turned over to South Vietnam when American troops leave.

750 tons of bombs are dropped near the Cambodian border by U.S. B-52 bombers.

Aug. 19—U.S. forces involved in sharp fighting near Danang are reinforced by 600 additional troops.

Aug. 20—At a news conference in Washington, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers says that U.S. forces eased their pressure on enemy troops during the 2-month lull in fighting this summer.

Aug. 21—A toll of 244 battle deaths reported for U.S. soldiers last week is the highest weekly rate in 2 months.

Aug. 23—U.S. President Richard Nixon defers his decision on further reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam until September. He is awaiting an evaluation of recent increases in fighting.

U.S. troops capture a hill south of Danang. The troops have been trying to reach a helicopter which was shot down in the area a week earlier.

Aug. 27—North Vietnam may be scaling down the number of troops infiltrating into South Vietnam, according to a U.S. State Department release.

Aug. 28—At the 32d session of the Paris peace talks, U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge warns North Vietnam and the Vietcong that further U.S. troop withdrawals depend on a reduction of enemy military activity.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 6—Political police close the country's leading news magazine *Primera Plana* and confiscate all copies after the magazine

printed a story on politics in the military regime.

Aug. 12—A new magazine, *Ojo*, published by the firm which put out *Primera Plana*, is confiscated by political police and the publishing concern is closed by the government.

BRAZIL

Aug. 1—The military government of President Artur da Costa e Silva announces the new national budget of almost \$5 billion.

Aug. 15—A radio station in São Paulo is seized by 12 men carrying submachine guns. They broadcast an attack on the military government and then leave before they can be captured. The men are believed to belong to the group which has staged frequent bank robberies in recent months to finance opposition to the military government.

Aug. 16—The military government announces that municipal elections are scheduled for November 30, in the first use of the popular ballot since 1968.

Aug. 31—Three leading military officers assume control of Brazil after President Artur da Costa e Silva suffers a stroke. Vice President Pedro Aleixo, who should succeed to the office under the constitution, is disallowed by the military.

CAMBODIA

Aug. 4—The rapid formation of a new government is demanded by Prince Norodom Sihanouk as a prerequisite for his remaining as Chief of State.

CHILE

Aug. 10—The possibilities of commercial exchanges between Chile and Cuba are to be explored for the first time since 1959. Two representatives of fruit and wine producers fly to Cuba for talks.

Aug. 16—The ruling Christian Democratic party nominates Radomiro Tomic Romero, former Chilean ambassador to the U.S., as its candidate for the presidency in next year's election. The Chilean constitution forbids another term for the current President, Eduardo Frei Montalva.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Aug. 11—*Hsinhua*, the official press agency, reports briefly on the accord reached with the U.S.S.R. over river navigation rights and boundaries. A technical agreement on these matters was signed by the representatives of the 2 governments on August 8.

Aug. 15—*Hsinhua* reports government charges that the U.S.S.R. is mobilizing for war against China and warns the Chinese people to prepare for conflict with the Soviet Union.

Aug. 18—Reports reach Hong Kong that rival factions are fighting in Shansi province in northern China.

Aug. 19—The Foreign Ministry accuses the U.S.S.R. of instigating 429 border incidents in June and July.

Aug. 29—*The New York Times* publishes eyewitness reports of large-scale troop movements heading north toward the Sino-Soviet border.

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (Nationalist)

Aug. 23—Prison terms ranging from 2 months to 8 years are ordered for 23 men, 9 of them government officials, in a corruption case. The 23 are convicted of bribing customs officials, paying kickbacks to truckers and discriminatory treatment of farmers in the banana export business.

CONGO (Kinshasa)

Aug. 1—President Joseph Mobutu makes several new Cabinet appointments. Cyrille Adoula, currently Congolese Ambassador to the U.S., becomes Foreign Minister.

CUBA

(See also *Chile*)

Aug. 23—A report in *The New York Times* describes an agreement between the governments of Cuba and Mexico on fishing rights. Cuban vessels may catch fish 3 miles within the 9-mile limit established by Mexico. Mexico has the same agreement with Japan and with the U.S.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 2—President Ludvik Svoboda and Communist party leader Gustav Husak arrive in the Crimea (U.S.S.R.) for "a vacation." Talks with Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev will focus on the prevention of anti-government demonstrations in Czechoslovakia on August 21, the first anniversary of the invasion by Warsaw Pact forces.

Aug. 5—*Rude Pravo*, Czechoslovak Communist party newspaper, prints a warning against any violence on August 21.

Aug. 7—Underground opposition groups circulate leaflets warning against violence and saying that disruptive acts would serve as a pretext for further repressions.

Aug. 11—Slovak church leaders appeal for calm on August 21.

Aug. 13—Gustav Husak and party leader Lubomir Strougal appeal for calm in the face of an "antisocialist conspiracy" to heighten tension on the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion.

Aug. 14—The army and militia are alerted by the Czechoslovak government "to proceed immediately and with all severity" against any agitators on the anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion.

Aug. 18—Thousands of demonstrators gathered in Prague are driven away by police and army troops preparing for the first anniversary of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of the country.

Aug. 19—A nonviolent demonstration in Prague is broken up by troops and police.

Aug. 21—Demonstrators again crowd into Wenceslas Square in Prague in protest against the 1968 invasion. Police arrest more than 300 citizens.

Aug. 22—Police and demonstrators clash in Brno. Prague officials report that 1,337 demonstrators have been arrested in that city.

Aug. 27—Premier Oldrich Cernik issues a public criticism of former party leader Alexander Dubcek. There is speculation in Prague that Dubcek may soon lose his remaining post as National Assembly chairman.

EIRE

(See also *United Kingdom*)

Aug. 19—The outlawed Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) is assailed by Prime Minister John Lynch. He says that "the government will not tolerate any usurpation of their powers by any group whatsoever." The I.R.A. has boasted that it sent fully equipped units into Northern Ireland to take part in the recent fighting.

Aug. 28—A proposal for negotiations leading to the merger of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic is made by Prime Minister John Lynch of the Irish Republic.

FRANCE

Aug. 8—In a surprise move, the French government devalues the franc. Its value is reduced from 20.255 cents (U.S.) to 18.004 cents. France has recently lost about half of the \$7 billion gold and currency reserves she had before the May, 1968, strikes.

Aug. 10—In order to curb possible inflation following the devaluation of the franc, the government freezes prices on nearly all industrial goods, wholesale and retail commodities.

Aug. 21—The Ministry of Finance, inspecting retail stores, says nearly one-fourth have raised prices illegally since devaluation.

Aug. 27—The Ministry of Finance announces that France will draw up to \$1 billion from the International Monetary Fund to keep the franc from falling below its floor of 17.87 cents.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Aug. 26—The Ministry of Economics publishes figures which show that trade between East and West Germany has risen sharply in recent months. An increase of 26 per cent is registered in the first 6 months of 1969 over the corresponding period in 1968.

GHANA

Aug. 22—A new constitution is issued to help restore civilian rule. The army-backed Na-

tional Liberation Council, which has ruled since President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, establishes a presidential commission which will gradually be replaced by elected officials.

GREECE

Aug. 12—Protesting his summary recall by the military government in Athens, Georgè Christopoulos submits his resignation as Ambassador to the U.S. Christopoulos is believed to have angered his government by his repeated warnings that failure to return democratic procedures to Greece is increasing the isolation of Greece from its allies abroad.

Aug. 23—The Union of Athens Journalists attacks the draft of a new law governing newspapers as a “humiliation of journalism.” The military government proposes penalties for “lack of faith and devotion to the country” and confiscation of any paper insulting the King. Fiscal control of the press is to be taken over by committees appointed by the government.

Aug. 27—A government court-martial sentences Agheliki Maghakis, daughter of a former Premier, to 4 years in prison for saying that the police tortured her husband. The charge is “insulting the authorities and spreading false rumors.”

GUYANA

Aug. 2—The government announces that Guyana will become a republic on February 23, 1970. The British governor general will be replaced by a President to be elected by the Guyanese Parliament. Guyana will remain a member of the British Commonwealth.

Aug. 8—A 6,000-square-mile triangle of land in dispute between Guyana and Surinam is invaded by Surinam forces.

Aug. 17—The government signs an aid pact with the U.S. for \$2.5 million in development projects.

Aug. 19—Prime Minister Forbes Burnham issues a statement that Guyanese and Surinam forces have clashed along their common border.

HAITI

Aug. 16—President François Duvalier sends 2 factions of his family out of the country to prevent further feuding over the question of succession to his rule.

Aug. 30—Official sources in Washington confirm the report that 9 Roman Catholic priests have been expelled from Haiti for distributing “Communist articles harmful to the government and to the person of the Chief of State.”

INDIA

Aug. 3—A hit-and-run attack by Naga tribesmen causes the Indian government to send troop reinforcements to the area. The Chinese-trained rebels used rifles and mortars of Chinese manufacture.

Aug. 16—Members of Parliament and the 17 state legislatures vote for a new President of India. Four days will be required for counting the votes. The candidates are the former vice president, V. V. Giri, who is a Congress party member running as an independent with the support of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, a conservative Congress party member who has long opposed Mrs. Gandhi.

Aug. 20—Final returns in India’s presidential election show that V. V. Giri has won with 420,077 votes to 405,427 for Neelam Sanjiva Reddy.

Aug. 21—Conservative members of the Congress party, known as the Syndicate, schedule a meeting for August 25 to censure Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for her support of President-elect V. V. Giri in opposition to the party’s candidate.

Aug. 25—Conservatives in the Congress party withdraw their attempt to censure Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

INDONESIA

Aug. 16—A group of 2,500 Communist prisoners from among the 80,000 now in various camps are to be sent to Buru Island for rehabilitation.

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 10—The government announces a major aid agreement between Iraq and the U.S.S.R. Soviet aid will be paid for by shipments of Iraqi crude oil.

Aug. 25—15 "spies" convicted of working for the U.S. and Israel are executed.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis, Syria*)

Aug. 17—A threatened split within the majority Labor party is averted as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announces he will not challenge the regular party candidates in the upcoming October elections.

ITALY

Aug. 1—An attempt to form a new government fails. Premier Mariano Rumor, a Christian Democrat who has been heading a caretaker government since July 5, says he is unable to reconstruct a coalition cabinet.

Aug. 2—Senate President Amintore Fanfani undertakes to find a solution to the political impasse. He will attempt to reconcile the Socialists with the Christian Democratic government.

Aug. 5—Rumor succeeds in forming a Cabinet in which the Christian Democrats will be a minority.

Aug. 12—The new Cabinet wins an important test vote, bringing to a temporary end the 38-day government crisis.

JAPAN

Aug. 18—Police storm the administration building of Hiroshima University, ending a 6-month sit-in by radical students. The raid, in which 1,200 police took part, was made possible by a new law giving greater power to the administration and government to end university tie-ups. Students are striking at about one-third of Japan's 327 universities.

Aug. 26—The annual meeting of foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea opens

with a pledge of mutual cooperation for peace in Asia. Planning for cooperation in the economic sphere is begun.

JORDAN

Aug. 12—A new Premier, Bahjat al-Talhouni, and a new Cabinet are appointed by King Hussein. The move is apparently an attempt to cooperate more closely with other Arab nations and to increase control over Arab guerrilla groups operating against Israel from Jordanian soil.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Aug. 18—A government broadcast announces that a U.S. Army helicopter has been shot down over Kumchon, 15 miles north of the border of South Korea.

Aug. 19—North Korea rejects a call for immediate talks at the Armistice Commission site in Panmunjom. August 21 is suggested as an alternate date for discussions about the downed helicopter.

Aug. 29—A North Korean spokesman at the Military Armistice Commission meeting in Panmunjom says the 3 crewmen aboard a U.S. helicopter shot down over North Korean territory on August 17 are alive, but 2 are seriously injured.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Japan*)

Aug. 7—Supporters of President Chung Hee Park submit a bill to the National Assembly which would remove a 3d-term ban on the presidency so that Park can run again.

Aug. 8—Opponents of President Park sit in on the speaker's dais in the Assembly in an attempt to block action on the bill to permit Park to run for a 3d term.

Aug. 15—A parliamentary by-election is won by opponents of President Park.

Aug. 20—President Park arrives in the U.S. for 2 days of talks with U.S. President Richard Nixon.

Aug. 26—Police and students at Korea University clash as students denounce the proposed constitutional change that would allow President Park to seek a 3d term.

LEBANON

Aug. 31—Some 8,000 Iraqis leave Lebanon and the remaining 7,000 will leave soon, according to Iraqi government sources. Lebanon has insisted on the departure of the Iraqi residents following conflict with Iraq's Ba'ath party government.

MEXICO

(See *Cuba*)

NIGERIA

Aug. 2—Pope Paul VI meets with representatives of the Nigerian government and of Biafra to urge resumption of peace talks and discuss relief flights into Biafra.

Aug. 18—The government of Biafra agrees to allow Nigerian inspection of daytime food shipments into Biafra. The Nigerians have insisted on inspection to make sure no arms are included in the shipments of food and medicine.

Aug. 19—Relief administrators in Biafra say that death from starvation is increasing. The death rate has risen by about 50 per cent since relief flights were stopped in June.

Aug. 25—Biafran officials say that relief flights have increased in the past 10 days.

PAKISTAN

Aug. 4—In another step toward restoring civilian government, President A. M. Yahya Khan appoints 7 members to a civilian Council of Ministers. The new ministers will handle all the country's affairs except defense, foreign affairs and planning.

PERU

Aug. 23—A government order has been issued modifying the August 18 order to expropriate and run the entire W. R. Grace and Company complex. Peru will administer only the sugar enterprises. Grace plants which manufacture plastics, paper and alcohol will not be taken over. Government attachment of properties belonging to the International Petroleum Company remains.

PORTUGAL

Aug. 9—All election campaign committees, except those now having official recognition, are banned by the government. Opposition groups have been setting up committees in preparation for elections to be held at the end of October.

Aug. 30—*A Capital*, a newspaper published in Lisbon, expresses concern over the termination of food relief programs administered by Catholic Welfare Relief Services. Food shipments from the U.S. under the Food for Peace Program are being shifted from Europe to Africa and Asia.

RUMANIA

Aug. 3—On the second day of a 2-day visit, U.S. President Richard Nixon is greeted with enthusiasm by Rumanian crowds. During his visit, Nixon agrees to reopen formal negotiations on a consular convention and to seek ways to increase trade between the 2 countries.

Aug. 6—At the opening of the 10th Congress of the Rumanian Communist party, President Nicolae Ceausescu stresses the right of each country to develop its own domestic and foreign policies.

SPAIN

Aug. 17—A Spanish court sentences 5 U.S. students to 6 months in prison for insulting the Spanish flag during a parade in Alicante on June 21.

SURINAM

(See *Guyana*)

SYRIA

Aug. 29—The government starts granting visas to visitors from the U.S. and Britain for the first time since June, 1967, Arab Israeli war.

A TWA airliner is hijacked after taking off from Rome. It lands in Damascus and off-loads the passengers before a bomb explodes in the cockpit. The hijackers demand the imprisonment of an Israeli passenger. Syria is releasing all but 6 Israelis and the 2 hijackers.

Aug. 30—Syrian officials free 105 of the 113

passengers from the hijacked plane. Six Israelis are being held hostage for the release of Syrian prisoners of war in Israel, according to a communiqué from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Aug. 31—Four Israeli women passengers on the hijacked TWA plane are released by Syrian officials. No statement is issued about the two male Israeli passengers who are still being held.

THAILAND

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—Following the departure of U.S. President Richard Nixon, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman says Thailand would like to withdraw the 12,000 Thai combat troops from South Vietnam in view of the burden Thailand faces at home.

Aug. 19—Thai officials affirm the existence of a contingency plan which would place U.S. troops under Thai military command in fighting outside Thai borders, in the event that Thailand is threatened by external aggression.

Aug. 25—A statement by Premier Thanom Kittikachorn indicates that Thailand is not pressing the U.S. to withdraw its 49,000 troops from Thailand. Debate in the U.S. Senate had brought rumors from Thailand that a total withdrawal of U.S. troops might be requested.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *China, People's Republic of*)

Aug. 8—*Tass*, Soviet press agency, reports that China and the U.S.S.R. have signed an agreement ensuring normal navigation on the river boundaries between the 2 countries. The Argun, Amur, Ussuri and Sungacha Rivers have been the scenes of sporadic clashes in recent months.

Aug. 9—*Tass* reports that Chinese leaders are using the 42d anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to propagandize against the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 13—A clash between Chinese and Soviet forces erupts on the Kazakhstan-Sin-kiang border.

Aug. 28—*Pravda*, the Communist party newspaper, prints a long editorial warning that a Sino-Soviet war would inevitably involve nuclear weapons and endanger the world.

U.A.R.

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

UNITED KINGDOM

(See also *Eire*)

Northern Ireland

Aug. 3—A Protestant parade in Belfast, Northern Ireland, sets off rioting as the paraders try to invade a Roman Catholic area of the city. Police use water cannon to disperse the mobs.

Aug. 5—Gasoline bombs are thrown at Belfast police trying to break up fights between roving bands of Protestants and Catholics.

Aug. 13—Eighty policemen and 12 civilians are hospitalized following battles between religious militants in Londonderry.

Aug. 14—Prime Minister John Lynch of Eire, the Irish Republic south of Northern Ireland, expresses doubt that British troops can restore order and he urges a United Nations peace force to step in.

Aug. 15—British troops move into Londonderry after 2 adults and a child are killed in the violence sweeping the area. A special force of 8,000 constables is mobilized by the government in Belfast.

Aug. 16—A 3d night of fires and shooting disturbs Belfast as British soldiers patrol the riot-torn areas.

Aug. 17—Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark says he will proceed with planned civil rights reforms. He denounces Eire for urging a United Nations peacekeeping force for Ireland.

Aug. 19—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark of Northern Ireland announce that the British government will take over the responsibility for security following the sectarian rioting that has swept Northern Ireland in recent days.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Aug. 1—The Department of Justice files suit

to require the school officials of the state of Georgia to end the racially dual public school system. This is the first federal suit against a state board of education. When the federal court in Atlanta orders desegregation, 36 Georgia school districts whose federal funds have been cut off because of segregated school facilities will receive federal funds again.

Aug. 20—A plan that called for the immediate desegregation of 33 Mississippi school districts is withdrawn by Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Finch claims that educators had insufficient time to prepare the plan and that chaos will result if the plan is put into effect; he asks the court for a delay until December 1 to file substitute plans.

Aug. 25—The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., files a formal motion in the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asking the court to change the federal government from a fellow plaintiff to a defendant in the case against segregationist Mississippi school boards; the motion is denied, but it represents a break in the 15-year partnership of the N.A.A.C.P. and the federal government in the fight against school segregation.

Aug. 26—Lawyers from the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department meet to draft a protest against what is regarded by some as a softening by the administration of enforcement of civil rights laws.

In the 2d day of protests in Pittsburgh, 180 are arrested and 45 injured. Negroes are demonstrating against alleged discrimination in the building trades.

Aug. 27—An all-white school in Thomas, Louisiana, is closed after 6 Negro teachers assigned to the school are escorted into the building by U.S. officials.

Aug. 28—A federal appeals court in New Orleans grants the Nixon administration the delay it requested in the court-ordered desegregation of the 30 Mississippi school districts under Fifth Circuit Court jurisdiction. New plans must be filed by December 1.

In Pittsburgh, white construction work-

ers begin demonstrations. They are protesting an agreement reached between the mayor and members of the Black Construction Coalition which calls for a halt in construction on major projects until September 2 and an end to street demonstrations by the Negroes.

Aug. 29—The public schools of Denver and Oklahoma City are ordered to desegregate by Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., of the Supreme Court.

Economy

Aug. 4—A price rise of almost 5 per cent on a broad range of steel products is announced by Republic Steel, National Steel, Jones & Laughlin Steel and Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel. Only 2 of the 10 major steel producers have not followed the U.S. Steel Co. price rise which was announced on July 30.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 1—President Richard Nixon confers with Pakistani President A. M. Yahya Khan in Lahore.

Aug. 2—President Nixon is warmly welcomed in Rumania; he is the first U.S. President to visit a Communist state since President Franklin Roosevelt went to Yalta in 1945.

Aug. 3—President Nixon arrives in Washington after a 12-day trip around the world which included a brief meeting in England with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson.

In Hong Kong, Secretary of State William Rogers says the U.S. is willing to confer with Communist China but notes that China has not responded to recent U.S. overtures with regard to travel by U.S. citizens in China.

Aug. 4—The President reviews his new Asian policy for congressional leaders.

Aug. 8—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.) scores the State Department and the Department of Defense for refusing to let his committee see a "contingency plan" for U.S. military action in Thailand. (See *Current History*, Sept., 1969, p. 189. See also *Thailand*.)

Aug. 9—West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger leaves Washington after 2 days of talks with President Nixon.

Secretary of State William Rogers ends his Pacific tour with a stopover in American Samoa; he has outlined new U.S. policies to leaders in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

Aug. 15—A 4-point accord between Hungary and the U.S. is announced; it is aimed at improving relations between the 2 nations.

Aug. 21—The U.S. requests the "expeditious departure" of a member of the Cuban mission to the U.N., claiming that he has attempted to recruit a Cuban refugee to gather information concerning "the security of the office of the President."

Aug. 22—President Chung Hee Park of South Korea and President Nixon today conclude 2 days of talks and issue a statement that plays down the U.S. commitment to South Korean security.

The U.S. State Department announces that the U.S. and Thailand have agreed to begin discussions on reducing the 49,000-man U.S. military force in Thailand.

Aug. 25—State Department spokesmen deplore the burning of the Mosque of Al Aksa in Jerusalem and the executions of 15 "spies" in Iraq. However, they do not expect a full-scale war to ensue in the Middle East.

Aug. 27—It is announced that the U.S. will channel \$500,000 through the Organization of American States for rehabilitation work along the Honduran-Salvadoran border.

Government

Aug. 3—In Washington, the General Accounting Office makes public a report alleging that the B. F. Goodrich Company falsified records of tests of brakes for the new Air Force A-7D attack plane to hide defects.

Aug. 4—*The New York Times* reports that Dr. John Jennings, acting director of the Food and Drug Administration's Bureau of Medicine, has noted in a recent memoran-

dum that although investigation of prison testing programs for drugs now on the market has revealed no violations of the agency's regulations, "the question of the validity of the studies may still be raised. . . ." In July, *The New York Times* reported that Dr. Austin R. Stough had operated a profitable drug testing program in prison hospitals in Oklahoma, Arkansas and Alabama which resulted in the illness of prison inmates and which inadequately tested drugs now on the market in the U.S.

The House of Representatives approves the bill extending the 10 per cent surtax through 1969, with a vote of 237 to 170. The Senate has already passed the bill, which goes to the White House.

Aug. 5—B. F. Goodrich Company chairman Ward Keener denies that his company falsified test reports to hide brake defects.

Aug. 6—Voting 51 to 50, the Senate defeats an amendment that would have stopped work on the Safeguard missile defense system.

In a special message, President Richard Nixon asks Congress to set up a new federal agency to set industrial health and safety standards for U.S. workers if the states fail to impose such standards.

Aug. 7—The President urges Congress to establish a 12-year, \$10-billion mass transportation program.

Aug. 8—Congress receives an administration proposal to strengthen the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

In a nationwide televised address, President Nixon outlines plans for a major revision of the nation's welfare system. His plan would more than double the number of Americans eligible for public aid, establishing a minimum standard of federal aid for every family with children. The President also suggests a plan to share federal tax money with state and local governments.

Aug. 9—The President names *Baltimore Sun* maritime editor Helen Delich Bentley as a member and chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission.

Aug. 12—The Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, Dr. Herbert L. Ley, Jr., reveals the agency's plans for stricter controls on tests of new drugs.

President Nixon scores Congress for failing to support his revenue recommendations and criticizes the House for appropriating \$1.1 billion more for education than was requested in the administration's budget.

Aug. 14—The U.S. attorney in Montgomery, Alabama, says that he plans to ask for a grand jury session to investigate the drug testing programs operated by Dr. Austin Stough. A Post Office Department inquiry is already under way.

Aug. 18—A 3-man federal court rules that welfare recipients may not be denied public assistance solely on the basis of having denied caseworkers permission to enter their homes without a warrant.

Aug. 19—Dr. Jean Mayer, President Nixon's special consultant on food, nutrition and health, says that the proposed welfare reform would not eliminate the federal food stamp program.

Aug. 25—Daniel Patrick Moynihan, assistant to the President for urban affairs, says that an economic study predicts that the end of the Vietnam war will not free large sums of money for new social programs; the savings so effected will be used up in current and proposed military and domestic programs.

Dr. John Adriani, who had accepted the appointment as director of the Bureau of Medicine in the Food and Drug Administration, announces that the Nixon administration has withdrawn it. Adriani expresses his belief that the appointment was withdrawn at the instigation of the drug industry; he is well known for his advocacy of generic rather than brand names in drug prescriptions.

Aug. 26—One hundred lawyers from local offices of the Neighborhood Legal Services Project of the Office of Economic Opportunity request more support from the Nixon administration; the lawyers claim that they are frustrated in their efforts by

local politics; they cite the failure of "O.E.O. on the national level to support legal services in the field."

Secretary of Agriculture Clifford M. Hardin announces selective reductions ranging from 2 to 10 cents a bushel in wheat prices. He appeals to other nations to avoid spiraling the wheat-price war.

Aug. 27—Terry F. Lenzner, director of the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, assures 100 lawyers of the Neighborhood Legal Services Project that they have the support of the administration.

A group of Foreign Service officers are planning to ask the State Department to recognize their association as the only organization with which the department would deal in bargaining on personnel matters.

Labor

Aug. 4—The United Mine Workers of America, the union's Welfare and Retirement Fund, a union-owned bank and an association of mine owners and operators are sued by a group of miners and miners' widows; they are charged with conspiring to defraud the rank-and-file membership.

Aug. 12—Some 8,000 striking ground employees at Pan American World Airways vote to end a strike that began August 9; average wages for the ground employees are to be raised from \$3.30 an hour to \$4.52.

Military

Aug. 1—The Navy announces that it is reducing its coastal operations in an economy move. The Army announces that it is eliminating the Selected Reserve Force.

The Navy discloses that it has awarded a \$461-million contract to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the production of a fleet of advanced antisubmarine warfare planes.

Aug. 6—The Army announces that 8 Special Forces troops have been arrested in South Vietnam and charged with the murder of

a Vietnamese. (See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*.)

Aug. 15—The Australian and U.S. panel investigating the collision of the U.S. destroyer *Frank E. Evans* and the Australian carrier *Melbourne* on June 3 places the primary blame on the U.S. ship.

Aug. 21—Cuts of 100,000 men from the armed forces and \$1.5 billion from the Defense Department's budget for the current fiscal year are announced by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

Aug. 22—In line with the budget cuts announced yesterday by Laird, Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee announces the immediate retirement of 76 ships; more than 100 ships will be retired by the end of fiscal 1970 with a resulting military manpower reduction of 72,000.

Aug. 28—Central Intelligence Agency officials rebut charges that the Agency was involved in complicity in the murder of a South Vietnamese. Eight members of the Army's Special Forces are charged with murder in the case.

Race Relations

(See *Civil Rights*)

Supreme Court

Aug. 21—President Nixon submits to the Senate the nomination of South Carolinian Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

URUGUAY

Aug. 12—President Jorge Pacheco Areco wins a dispute with the Congress which had threatened to provoke a government crisis. A presidential decree mobilizing striking bank clerks into the Uruguayan army was protested by Congress. With the support of the army, the President reissues his decree without congressional dissent.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Aug. 9—The Internal Trade Ministry announces the end of rationing on 22 con-

sumer goods including toothbrushes and soap, matches and towels.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Aug. 2—A government spokesman confirms that nearly 50 military and civil service employees have been arrested recently on espionage charges. Huynh Van Trong, special assistant for political affairs to President Nguyen Van Thieu, is among those who will soon be brought to trial.

Aug. 22—Premier Tran Van Huong resigns under pressure from President Thieu.

Aug. 23—General Tran Thien Khiem is chosen Premier by President Thieu to replace Huong. Khiem, a military man, is a close associate of Thieu.

Aug. 26—President Thieu says that the new Cabinet headed by Khiem will maintain a hard line and that there will be no coalition with the Vietcong.

ZAMBIA

Aug. 11—President Kenneth Kaunda announces the end of copper mining rights granted in perpetuity. These rights will be replaced with 25-year leases. The mining companies involved, Roan Selection Trust and Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, will be invited to sell 51 per cent of their interests to the government to insure Zambian control.

Aug. 25—Vice President Simon Kapwepwe resigns in an effort to prevent tribal fighting from breaking out. Kapwepwe is a member of the minority Bemba tribe.

President Kenneth Kaunda assumes control of the governing United National Independence party and will act as party secretary general during the current tribal tensions.

Aug. 27—Vice President Kapwepwe withdraws his resignation at the request of President Kaunda, but will no longer carry on economic planning and treasury affairs.

PRINTED BY BUSINESS
PRESS, INCORPORATED



CURRENT *History* • 1822 Ludlow Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

ISSUES BELOW ARE AVAILABLE FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE
INDICATE IN PROPER SPACE THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE WANTED

Current Issues

- ☐ Vietnam and Southeast Asia (2/69)
- ☐ The World of Islam (3/69)
- ☐ East Europe (4/69)
- ☐ The Nations of Africa (5/69)

- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Latin America (6/69)
- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Europe and the Middle East (7/69)
- ☐ U.S. Military Commitments in Asia (8/69)

- ☐ Communist China after 20 Years (9/69)
- ☐ The Soviet Union, 1969 (10/69)

Coming Soon

- ☐ Black America: A Historical Survey (11/69)
- ☐ Southeast Asia (12/69)
- ☐ The Middle East (1/70)
- ☐ Latin America (2/70)
- ☐ Africa (3/70)
- ☐ The Nations of the Pacific (4/70)
- ☐ The Atlantic Community (5/70)

Still Available

- ☐ U.S. Crime: Its Scope & Causes (6/67)
- ☐ U.S. Crime & Law Enforcement (7/67)
- ☐ U.S. Crime: Punishment & Prevention (8/67)

- ☐ Latin America 1967 (11/67)
- ☐ France (3/68)
- ☐ India (4/68)
- ☐ Germany (5/68)

- ☐ U.S. Military Service in Historical Perspective (6/68)
- ☐ U.S. Selective Service: An Evaluation (7/68)
- ☐ National Service and United States Defense (8/68)

- ☐ Mainland China (9/68)
- ☐ Issues of the Presidential Election (10/68)
- ☐ The Soviet Union (11/68)
- ☐ The American Cities (12/68)
- ☐ Latin America and the Caribbean (1/69)

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 year, \$8.50; 2 years, \$16.50; 9 months, \$6.75.

NINE-MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$6.75; 5 or more, \$5.85 per sub.; 10 or more, \$5.40 per sub.; 30 or more, \$4.95 per sub.; 50 or more, \$4.45 per sub.

TWELVE-MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$8.50; 5 or more, \$7.55 per sub.; 10 or more, \$7.05 per sub.; 30 or more, \$6.55 per sub.; 50 or more, \$5.95 per sub.

RATES FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE: 1 copy of a single issue, 95¢ per copy; 5 or more copies of different issues, 75¢ per copy; 5 or more of the same issue, 65¢ per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 60¢ per copy; 30 or more of the same issue, 55¢ per copy; 100 or more of the same issue, 50¢ per copy.

RATES FOR COPIES MORE THAN TWO YEARS OLD (1941 through 1966): \$1.45 per copy. Current History has a small inventory of many issues from 1941 through 1965.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Please send me group subscriptions for ☐ 9 months; or ☐ 12 months.
- ☐ 1 year \$8.50, plus 3 free issues as marked above. ☐ 2 years \$16.50, plus 3 free issues as marked above.
- ☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add 50¢ for Canada; 75¢ for foreign.

MR.
MISS
MRS.

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP CODE

All these offers good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Note: Group and quantity rates are based on a single mailing address for all subscriptions or issues ordered
10-69-3

SUBSCRIBE NOW

to CURRENT *History's* area studies

What *Current History* offers . . .

Current History's unique area studies give worldwide coverage in depth—offering contemporary focus and historical perspective. Unlike a book or pamphlet, *Current History* provides automatic revision. Every year new issues on important areas such as Africa, Russia, China, Europe, Latin America and Asia update *Current History's* continuing study of international problems.

SCHOLARLY • ACCURATE • OBJECTIVE • READABLE

Current History issues contain

TIMELY ARTICLES • Exploring the political, economic and social aspects of the problem area. Our contributors include historians, economists, diplomats and government specialists from the United States and overseas.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS • Relevant texts of important treaties, agreements, speeches and diplomatic notes.

BOOK REVIEWS • Notes on new books in the fields of history, international affairs, economics and social sciences.

CHARTS and MAPS • To illustrate the text.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW • *Current History's* day-by-day record of the month's news, covering all the countries of the world, the only one of its kind published in the United States and a handy index to *who, what, where and when.*

COLLEGE
DWAYNE CA - P
SANDY TEXAS 75755

SIGN UP TODAY!...RECEIVE 3 FREE GIFT ISSUES!

As a special introduction to *Current History*, we offer each new subscriber 3 free issues. With a year's subscription you will in fact receive 15 issues of *Current History*. Select your 3 gift issues from our list of available issues on the other side of this cover.

◀ PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR DETAILS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED